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Abstract
The prize system for innovation has been criticized as impractical due to the lack of any workable
formula or algorithm to determine the size of prizes. In this paper, a decentralized market mechanism via
the intertemporal bounty (IB) system can function to duplicate Pareto optimality. Under this system, any
bountiable innovation is placed in the public domain, and the prize of innovation is dynamically amor-
tized in an infinite time domain as periodic bounties paid to holders of bounty claims. Periodic bounties
are calculated using a government-determined bounty rate times observed market sales. Two formu-
las are derived to calculate “long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate” and “long-run suboptimal bounty
rate.” The former can correct monopoly distortions and externalities, while the latter can only address
monopoly distortions. They are empirically computable and can serve as an upper bound and the lower
bound of the bounty rate. This paper provides a dynamic general-equilibrium analysis of replacing
finitely-lived patents with the IB system using either of these two bounty rates. Based on a non-scale
growth model calibrated to the US economy, transition paths are worked out to compute welfare gains.
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1 Introduction
There are alternative reward systems including patent and prize designed to promote technological innova-
tion.1 Patent is a commercial reward system for the government to confer upon the innovator short-lived in-
tellectual property rights. This allows the innovator to turn the shadow price of a patent-protected innovation
into a reward in the form of monopoly profits accruing during the granted patent life. Prize is a tax-financed
public reward system for the government to award a prize for the innovator to place an innovation in the
public domain. The prize is awarded, once and for all, to reflect its social value. Hence, a prize system can
spur innovation without creating monopoly distortions.2 The patent system, however, must always seek to
balance short-run monopoly distortion against long-run dynamic innovation [Nordhaus (1969)], and tends
to provide inadequate incentives for innovation in that the shadow price of a patent-protected innovation
is usually below the social value.3 If the government knows how to set prizes to the social value, a prize
system can be Pareto optimal and outshine the patent system as suboptimal.4
Polanvyi (1944) trumpeted the prize system informally. Four decades later, Wright (1983) developed
a formal model to compare patents and prizes. This seminal paper emphasizes asymmetric information
between governments and innovators, showing that prizes can be superior to patents if the government is
appropriately informed about an innovation’s social surplus and costs. Shavell and Van Ypersele (2001)
restricts asymmetric information to market demand, presuming that the innovator knows the exact market
demand curve and that the government is only informed of its probability distribution. They demonstrate
that an optional patent-or-prize system can dominate the patent system. Under this optional system, the
prize is determined at the smallest possible social surplus, and the innovator is free to choose either a patent
or a prize.5
In principle, prize systems — either optional or mandatory — are subject to the government’s informa-
tional readiness to determine the social value of innovations. This concern has been raised in Wright (1983),
Scotchmer (1999), Shavell and Van Ypersele (2001) and Hopenhayn et al. (2006). To resolve this prob-
lem, Kremer (1998) suggests a patent buyouts mechanism to determine the private value or shadow price of
1This paper focuses on patent and prize as two competing reward systems. To avoid terminological confusions, we note that
some economists such as Shavell and Van Ypersele (2001) distinguish intellectual property rights (patents, copyrights, etc.) from
all reward systems.
2Some tax-induced distortions may take place if lump-sum taxes are unavailable. However, technical innovations have public-
good features. Prizes for innovation can be financed in a manner that results in no additional distortion; see Kaplow (1996) and
Footnote 6 of Kremer (1998).
3Whether patents had contributed to innovation and productivity has recently been questioned in Boldrin and Levine (2013)
and Williams (2013). In theory, patents may lead to over-investment in research and development, if externatlities such as research
congestion or patent races are significant enough to diminish an innovation’s social value. This possibility appears in the present
paper , Jones and Williams (2000) and others. Empirically, under-investment in R&D is however so obvious: the social rate return
to R&D is at least twice the private rate of return according to Mansfield et al. (1977) and Mansfield et al. (1981) and Jones and
Williams (2000).
4Many studies have sought to improve efficiency by fine-tuning a patent’s dimensions such as length, or scope, or both; see,
for instance, Judd (1985), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Klemperer (1990), Matutes et al. (1996), and O’Donoghue and Zweimuller
(2004). But patents, designed to function by introducing monopolies, are doomed to be suboptimal, no matter how one fine-tunes
their dimensions. Besides, it is difficult to harmonize patents and other form of intellectual property rights between developed and
developing economies; see Helpman (1993) and Grinols and Lin (2006). Romer (1990) shows that subsidizing R&D input can
achieve the Pareto optimum in his seminal growth model where all firms are noncompetitive. But this subsidization policy is at
most second-best in a more general context where competitive and noncompetitive firms co-exit, as in the present paper.
5See Proposition 5 in Shavell and Van Ypersele (2001).
patents through an auction process.6 The government then offers to purchase patents at this private value
times some constant markup to match up to the social value, and these purchased patents would be mostly
placed in the public domain.7 Kremer’s idea is clever because auctioning patents allows the government to
harness private information.
True, the above-cited studies have provided valuable insights into the relative costs and benefits between
patents and prizes. However, there are some limitations in their industrial organization approach. First,
they use static partial-equilibrium models. While this approach allows to highlight the role of asymmetric
information, it does not allow the dynamic general-equilibrium market mechanism to work, for instance,
to effect an innovation’s private value and social value as well as the required rate of return that makes
households willing to finance business firm’s forward-looking investments. Moreover, static models cannot
unfold the dynamic nature of innovating activities that invent new products or processes over time. Second,
these previous studies always posit a prize system that pays prizes, once and for all, for technological
innovation. True, in static models, prizes cannot be awarded with any intertemporal arrangement. But in a
dynamic real world, the social value of any innovation at a point in time is a discounted sum of the value
stream it emanates in the future. This applies to the private value as well. An observed innovation is valuable
today, but its value, either social or private, will change over time, and may even risk being destroyed by
competing products or processes in the future. Accordingly, prizes are forward-looking and difficult to
estimate especially for new innovations. The government may award a prize for some innovation that is
worth nothing in the future. Third, as Abramowicz (2003) argues, there does not exist any workable formula
or algorithm to calculate prizes in the literature.8 This makes the prize system impractical.
The purpose of the present paper is to resolve all these limitations existing in the patent-prize literature.
It represents the first work that provides a dynamic general-equilibrium analysis of replacing finitely-lived
patents with a dynamically-amortized prize system that rewards the innovator with periodic bounties. The
analytical vehicle uses a non-scale R&D-based growth model based on Jones (1995), Jones and Williams
(2000) and Eicher and Turnovsky (2001).9 This growth model features, among other things, a constant pop-
ulation growth rate and a semi-endogenous innovation rate at which private investment in R&D (research
and development) leads to an ongoing flow of innovative blueprints for manufacturing new types of capi-
tal goods. In the modeled economy, patents can create monopoly price distortions to weaken demand for
capital goods, as commonly seen in the literature. Moreover, these distortions can skew the relative prices
of patented and unpatented capital goods. This gives rise to a socially inefficient mix of capital goods in
production of final goods and translates into an economy-wide loss in total factor productivity (TFP).10 To
6Guell and Fischbaum (1995) also suggest a different buyouts program for the government to exercise its power of eminent
domain to purchase pharmaceutical patents at a price determined by judges.
7Based on Mansfield et al. (1981), Kremer makes the conservative assumption that the social value of patents is on average
twice the private value. He cautions that the government should prevent bidders from colluding in the auction process.
8This was the reason that Kremer (1998) proposed an auction mechanism for patent buyouts. As Kremer anticipated, some
problems may arise from substitute patents or collusion among bidders. Regardless, it remains difficult for auctioning to determine
the private value of an observed innovation at a point in time, given that this value is subject to future innovations.
9Romer (1990) is a seminal paper introducing an endogenous R&D-based growth model of expanding variety, Jones (1995)
extends by removing the well-know scale effects. Recently, there is an emerging stream of studies examining patent policy using
different classes of R&D-based growth models; see, for instance, Helpman (1993), O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004), Grinols
and Lin (2006), Chu (2009), Iwaisako and Futagami (2013), Lin (2013), etc.
10In the endogenous growth literature, little attention was paid to the negative effects of patents on TFP. Chu (2010) is one of
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better calibrate the model to empirical data, we follow Comin (2004) to allow both R&D and non-R&D ele-
ments to drive TFP to change over time, so that R&D can only contribute a plausibly small fraction in TFP
growth. The proposed dynamically-amortized prize system can work to remove both capital demand and
TFP distortions. Under this system, the reward for a technical innovation (blueprint) is a bounty claim to an
infinite stream of ongoing bounties, payable on ex post (observed) market sales at a government-determined
bounty rate. These sales cover all those capital goods that embody the same blueprint, irrespective of who
these sellers are. That is, instead of a “once-and-for-all” prize paid at a time as in the literature, the prize
is dynamically amortized in an infinite time domain as periodic bounty payments, which are equal to the
bounty rate times observed market sales in each time period. For brevity, we use intertemporal bounty to
refer to such a dynamically-amortized prize system.11
The intertemporal bounty (IB) system as analyzed herein is mandatory. Its designed mechanism is
summarized as follows. First, any innovative blueprint must be placed in the public domain in exchange
for a tradeable bounty claim, thereby creating free access to non-rival innovations (blueprints) and ensuring
competitive provision of any bountiable goods. Second, bounty payments are financed by lump-sum taxes
to sustain an active asset market for bounty claims. The equilibrium price of bounty claims reflects the
discounted present value of expected ongoing bounty flows. If desired, the innovator can choose at any
moment to cash the entire prize, once and for all, by selling her bounty claim at the free market equilibrium
price. Third, by raising the bounty rate, the government can increase a bountiable innovation’s private
value through an increase in the bounty-claim price, ceteris paribus. This can promote more investment in
R&D and spur technological innovation. Fourth, a valuable flexibility is that the the government can adjust
the bounty rate to internalize various externalities such as knowledge spillovers or research congestion,
so that the private value of a potential innovation can be navigated to the social value. In addition, the
government can always fine-tune the bounty rate as desired if observed economic conditions deviate from
policy objectives. In a nutshell, an intertemporal bounty system can function with an adjustable bounty rate
and can be Pareto optimal. In contrast, the “once-and-for-all” prize system is lack of such flexibilities, while
patents are suboptimal and inflexible to cope with externalities.
An important contribution of the paper is that we derive a formula to calculate a long-run Pareto optimal
bounty rate for the intertemporal bounty system to be Pareto efficient in the long run. This optimal bounty
rate enables a patent-regime economy to switch to a bounty-regime economy, and then transition over time
to the social planner’s long-run optimum.12 This formula requires information on an economy’s steady-
state aggregate variables (TFP growth rate, final output growth rate, capital share, and real interest rate),
parametrized externalities (knowledge spillovers and research congestion), and price elasticity of bountiable
the very few exceptions.
11Grinols and Henderson (2007) proposed to replace pharmaceutical patents with an intertemporal-bounty. They discussed the
intertemporal bounty concept in a heuristic way. Later, Grinols and Lin (2011) formulated the intertemporal-bounty system in a
dynamic pharmaceutical sectoral-equilibriummodel, where the interest rate and the size of the pharmaceutical sector are exogenous,
among other things. In stark contrast, the present paper incorporates the intertemporal-bounty system in a non-scale R&D-based
growth model of expanding variety, and further relates this system for the first time to a dynamically amortized prize system with
tradeable bounty claims, as will be explained later.
12In fact, as the economy transitions to its long-rum social optimum, the Pareto optimal bounty rate should vary over time in
transition. As an initial inquiry into the IB system for a growing economy, this paper dose not apply the time-varying optimization
exercise, but directly sets a time-invariant bounty rate at its long-run optimal level.
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goods. Data of this sort is empirically available. In addition, we derive a formula to calculate a long-run
suboptimal bounty rate. This bounty rate ensures that in the long run a bounty-regime economy can have the
same R&D intensity as does the current (patent-regime) economy. Paying bounties based on either bounty
rate can remove patent-created monopoly distortions immediately. But to fully internalize externalities in
the long-run, bounties must be based on the long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate. From the perspective of
IB implementation, the two formulas can present two benchmark bounty rates.
For the first time in the patent-prize literature, the dynamic trajectory of an aggregate economy that
switches from patents to a dynamically amortized prize system is solved numerically in the paper. We
simulate the regime switch for a calibrated U.S. economy presumably beginning with a patent-regime steady
state. This switch places all innovations in the public domain, forcing the economy to jump to a new
trajectory that guides it to transition over time to a bounty-regime balanced growth path. The dynamics
in transition is governed by a nonlinear system of four first-order ordinary differential equations (ODE) in
two state variables (capital & knowledge stocks) and two control-like variables (final-output consumption
& bounty-claim price), where the stock of knowledge is measured by variety of capital goods. This presents
a nonlinear boundary value problem (BVP) and is solved numerically with a Python package that wraps a
Fortran BVP solver.13
Under a set of plausible benchmark parameters, the long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate is 0.30 (30 cents
per dollar sales) and the long-run suboptimal bounty rate is 0.14 (14 cents per dollar sales). If the regime
switch proceeds with with this long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate, the U.S. economy’s steady-state R&D
intensity (measured by the R&D/GDP ratio) will rise from 0.024 (patent regime) to 0.053 (bounty regime).
From the computed transition paths, the U.S. economy is seen to transition to one much more intensive in
both capital and knowledge than under the initial patent regime (20 years patent length). For instance, on
the computed bounty-regime balanced growth path, the stock of knowledge is 3.4 times as much as on the
initial patent-regime balanced growth path, the stock of capital is about 1.7 times as much, and per capita
consumption is 1.4 times as much.
The central market mechanism works as follow. On the one hand, compared to monopolistic provision,
competitive provision of capital goods expands market demand for forgone consumption and speeds up
capital accumulation. On the other hand, the long-run Pareto bounty rate of 0.30 is strong enough to make
the bounty-claim price jump up to match the social value of a potential innovation, thereby expanding R&D
demand for foregone consumption and spurring technological innovation. As a result, expanded demand for
foregone consumption pushes up the real interest rate in transition to make households willing to save more
to finance capital and knowledge accumulation. Households therefore experience short-run consumption
sacrifices. However, the long-run Pareto efficiency resulting from the regime switch can generate a net
consumption gain of 5.9 percent, after taking into account the short-lived consumption losses and robustness
checks. If instead the long-run suboptimal bounty rate of 0.14 is implemented, the net consumption gain is
seen to diminish to 3.0 percent for the benchmark scenario. As expected, this suboptimal bounty rate can
maintain the initial patent-regime R&D intensity of 0.024, but is not intended to internalize externalities.
13Solving a linearized dynamic system around the bounty-regime steady state would not make sense in the present paper, because
the patent-bounty regime switch represents a structural change that can lead to a bounty-regime steady state greatly differing from
the initial patent-regime steady state. This is especially true if the bounty rate is set at the long-run Pareto optimal level.
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In sum, the entire dynamic general-equilibrium analysis delivers the central message that an intertemporal
bounty regime, where the prize for innovation is dynamically amortize in an infinite time domain, can be a
Pareto-optimal alternative to the world’s long-standing patent system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a patent-regime R&D-based growth
model featuring multiple distortions from patents, knowledge spillovers, and research congestion. Section 3
evaluates the patent regime against the model’s social planner optimum. Section 4 introduces an intertem-
poral bounty regime and the resulting four-dimensional dynamic system while deriving two formulas for the
long-run Pareto optimal and suboptimal bounty rates. Section 5 calibrates the model to the initial patent-
regime steady state that largely mimics an innovating economy like the United States and solves the dynamic
system numerically. Transition paths, welfare gains, and the robustness checks are computed and analyzed.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model for Patent Regime
In this paper we formulated a patent regime for a closed economy using a non-scale R&D-based growth
model.14 This economy is endowed with labor L that grows exogenously. Labor and physical capital
are employed to produce final output Y , which can be used for consumption or for investment in either
durable (capital) goods X or R&D (research and development). Investing in durable goods X contributes
to the accumulation of physical capital K, while investing in R&D is to innovate technical designs for new
types of durable goods. Technical designs are indexed by i in a closed interval [0,V ] ⇢ R+. For each
design, the innovator receives a patent for a finite term denoted by T 2 (0, •). Patents are tradeable and
perfectly enforced. Within the finite patent term, every patented firm has the exclusive power to produce
and sell a specific type of durable good X [i]. Yet, once a patent expires, the granted monopoly power
vanishes and the out-of-patent firm reduces to a perfectly competitive firm immediately. All durables are
horizontally differentiated. Variable V represents not only the number of patents that have been issued, but
also a measure of the variety of available durable goods. Like K measuring the stock of capital, V is a proxy
of the knowledge stock in the model. The growth of V allows for a finer division of capital and leads to an
increase in the level of TFP (total factor productivity) for the economy.
The model described below is for an economy that implements a patent system. It has four sectors
referred to as household, final good, durable (capital) good, and R&D.
2.1 Household
There is a continuum of identical households with measure of one in the economy. Each household has
L identical workers, which also represent the economy’s population of labor. The population of labor is
normalized to one at time t = 0 and is assumed to grow at an exogenous rate, n. So, the size of a typical
14The model of the paper is a modification of Romer (1990) in three dimensions. First, patents are finitely lived. Second, as
in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), research input is from forgone consumption rather than from labor (human capital). Third, as
in Jones (1995), the R&D (innovation) function displays diminishing marginal returns to the research input, thereby removing the
empirically implausible scale effects. With these modifications, this model is closely related to Jones and Williams (2000) and
Eicher and Turnovsky (2001).
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household at time t is given by L[t] = ent . DefineC[t] as the rate of the economy’s aggregate consumption of
final goods and c[t]⌘ C[t]L[t] as the rate of per capita (or per worker) consumption at a point in time. For each
household, its family lifetime utilityU [t] at time t is given by
U [t] =
•ˆ
t
✓
c[s  t]1 g  1
1  g
◆
e (r n)(s t)ds, r > 0, g > 0 (1)
where r and g are two preference parameters with r measuring the rate of time preference and 1g the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution. All labor services are used for final goods production. Each household
owns assets including physical capital and patents. Its per capita asset stock is a[t] at a point in time and earns
the net capital income of r[t]a[t] at the market rate of interest. From each household, every worker earns
wage income w[t] at a point in time from a perfectly competitive labor market. Hence, a typical household’s
flow budget constraint is given by
a˙[t]⌘ da[t]
dt
= (r[t] n)a[t]+w[t]  c[t] (2)
Households take as given all market prices such as w[t] and r[t]. From a household’s intertemporal opti-
mization, the familiar Euler condition is
cˆ[t]⌘ c˙[t]
c[t]
=
r[t] r
g
. (3)
From (1) and (3), for the family lifetime utility to be bounded in the steady state, we invoke the parameter
constraint that r > n+ (1  g)cˆ0, where cˆ0 represents a constant steady-state growth rate of per capita
consumption under a patent regime. Throughout the paper, an overdot defines a time derivative of the
associated variable and the symbol ^ indicates its instantaneous growth rate. Henceforth, the time variable t
will be suppressed in most equations unless otherwise necessary.
2.2 Final goods
We chose final good Y as the numeraire. In the final goods sector there are many identical (competitive)
producers and the aggregate production function is given by
Y = (hL)1 a
✓ˆ V
0
X [i]sadi
◆1/s
, 0< s < 1
a
, (4)
where h is exogenous and can be interpreted as a non-R&D-driven efficiency index, h1 a is a non-R&D-
driven productivity term, Y is the economy’s aggregate final output or real GDP produced with labor L
supplied from households and V types of capital goods X [i] for i 2 [0,V ] that have been invented. We
assume that term h grows at a constant rate hˆ > 0 so that h[t] = ehˆt . Thus, h[t]L[t] = e(n+hˆ)t grows at an
exogenous rate of n+ hˆ. As the functional form implies, production of Y exhibits constant returns in labor
and capital goods and these capital goods are imperfectly substitutable. Each capital good, if patented, is
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priced at a markup equal to h ⌘ 1sa > 1.15 Profit maximization yields the following first-order conditions:
w= (1 a)Y/L (5a)
p[i] = a(hL)1 a
✓ˆ V
0
X [i]sadi
◆(1 s)/s
X [i]sa 1 (5b)
where p[i] is the price of capital good i, the fraction of 1 a in (5a) represents the labor share, and (5b) is
an inverse demand function for any capital good. This demand function implies that the price elasticity of
demand for an individual durable is equal to e = 11 sa > 1. The markup for any patented durable is therefore
given by h = ee 1 =
1
sa > 1. As for out-of-patent (or unpatented) durables, they are priced at marginal cost.
Final output Y is allocated for consumption C, capital investment IK , and R&D investment IV . As Y
represents the economy’s real GDP, the national income identity requires
Y =C+S=C+ IK + IV (6)
where S is the flow of aggregate saving (or forgone consumption) and must be equal to IK+IV in equilibrium.
Define s ⌘ SY = (Y  C)/Y as the saving rate, sK ⌘ IKY as the the rate of capital investment, and sV ⌘ IVY as
the rate of R&D investment (or called the economy’s R&D intensity). Then the flow equilibrium in saving
and investment is given by
s= 1 C
Y
= sK + sV (7)
Investment in capital goods (IK) accumulates the stock of capital K, while investment in R&D (IV ) creates
new varieties of capital goods and raises the stock of knowledge V . The two stocks of the economy evolve
over time according to
K˙ ⌘ dK
dt
= IK dK = sKY  dK (8a)
V˙ ⌘ dV
dt
= x IV = x sVY (8b)
where d is the rate of capital depreciation and x is an endogenous measure of research productivity. In
contrast to physical capital, the stock of knowledge does not depreciate over time, as in most endogenous
growth models, whereas Eicher and Turnovsky (2001) introduce knowledge depreciation. The measure of
research productivity in (8b) is endogenously determined in terms of x = µV f Il 1V , with µ > 0, f < f¯ < 1,
and 0 < l < 1. The parameter of µ is an exogenous technology term. To capture the positive externality
of knowledge spillovers, the parameter of f is restricted be positive, though it might be negative in theory.
Also, f must be less than an upper bound f¯ < 1 in order to ensure a bounded long-run innovation rate,
denoted by lim
t!•Vˆ [t] < •, where Vˆ ⌘
V˙
V .
16 The parameter of l is positive but less than one, meaning that
15If parameter s were set equal to one, production function (4) would reduce to Romer (1990). As such, durables would become
neither substitutable nor complementary and the markup h ⌘ 1sa would be 1a . In this paper, s is less than 1/a so that the markup
h is allowed to deviate from the inverse of the capital share (a), as in Jones and Williams (2000) and Eicher and Turnovsky (2001).
16From (8b) and (18), the instantaneous innovation rate is given by Vˆ = µV f 1(sVY )l . On a balanced-growth path, it can be
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research input IV displays social diminishing marginal return on research productivity. This captures the
effect of research congestion, which may result from too many research firms engaged in similar projects in
patent races.
For simplicity, each unit of foregone consumption can presumably produce a unit of each type of capital
goods, so that the stock of capital is given by K =
´ V
0 X [i]di. Foregone consumption is partially invested
in R&D, thereby enabling the economy to introduce new types of durables over time. These new capital
goods are patentable as soon as they are invented. Active R&D therefore keeps changing the composition
of patented and unpatented durable goods under a patent system, as will be analyzed later. What follows
describes individual firms’ pricing behavior in the durable goods sector.
2.3 Durable (capital) goods
Firms of capital goods may engage in monopolistic competition or perfect competition, depending on
whether or not they are under patent protection. As each unit of any type of durable goods requires one
unit of forgone consumption, r+d measures the user cost of capital (interest rate plus capital depreciation).
Given p[i] (the rental price of durable i), p[i]  (r+ d ) measures a firm’s unit profit. The profit function is
then given by
p[i] = (p[i]  r d )X [i], i 2 [0,V ]. (9)
At any point in time, there are V firms (or V varieties of available durables) in the capital goods sector.
Of these available durable goods, there are Vp patented durables supplied by monopolistic firms and Vnp
unpatented (out-of-patent) durables by competitive firms. That is, V = Vp +Vnp. Patented durables are
priced at the markup of h ⌘ 1sa > 1, while unpatented ones obey marginal cost pricing. These pricing
conditions are given by
p[i] =
8<:pnp = r+d for i 2 [0,Vnp]pp = h(r+d ) for i 2 (Vnp,V ] (10)
where pnp (= marginal cost) represents the competitive price of unpatented durables and pp the monopolistic
price of patented durables. From (10) and (5b), demands for patented and unpatented durables are related in
terms of:
Xnp = heXp (11)
where Xnp = X [i] for i 2 [0,Vnp], Xp = X [i] for i 2 (Vnp,V ], and Xnp > Xp due to he > 1. That is, on a
per-durable basis, the economy uses more of an unpatented capital good than a patented one, since each
patented durable costs more (pp > pnp). Define z ⌘ VpV as the fraction of patented durables and 1 z ⌘ VnpV
as the fraction for unpatented durables. Then one can use (11) to derive the stock of capital,
K =
ˆ V
0
X [i]di=VXnp(h ez +1 z ) (12)
shown that the long-run steady-state innovation rate is determined by lim
t!•Vˆ [t] =
l (n+eˆ)
1 f l/(es(1 a) , which is bounded and positive if
and only if f < f¯ ⌘ 1 l/[es(1 a)].
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where h e = Xp/Xnp. Equation (12) actually represents a market clearing condition for capital goods,
because K is the stock of forgone consumption borrowed to purchase both patented and unpatented durables.
2.4 Innovation under a patent system
This subsection discusses the innovation function (8b) and explains how the R&D-driven innovation rate
interacts with the dynamic evolution from patented to unpatented durables over time, given that patents are
finitely lived.
2.4.1 Innovation, patent value, and R&D intensity
In the research sector there is a stream of identical firms with measure of one. The innovation function
(8b) thus applies to the entire economy and any individual research firm as well. Under perfect competition
research firms borrow forgone consumption to develop new designs for capital goods. At the firm level,
research input IV and the flow V˙ of capital-good designs are linearly related, since the research productivity
measure of x in (8b) is taken as given in an individual research firm’s decision problem. Under a patent
system, the flow of new designs V˙ dt during an instant means the flow of newly issued patents and each of
these patents has a finite patent term denoted by T > 0. Each newly issued patent gives birth to a new firm
producing a new type of capital goods. Patents are tradeable. The market for patents is perfectly competitive.
The price u of a fresh patent issued at time t must reflect its future profitability during an entire patent life.
Hence,
u [t] =
ˆ t+T
t
e R[t]p[t]dt (13)
where R[t] ⌘ ´ tt r[w]dw is the cumulative sum of interest rates from t to t and p measures the profit flow
to any firm holding a legally live patent (see (9)). As such, a fresh patent’s market price reflects the private
value or shadow price of a potential innovation under the patent regime. The vintage of a live patent has no
effects on the profit flow. Under non-arbitrage conditions, the equilibrium price of a fresh patent must match
the cost of developing a new design. That is,
u [t] = 1/x [t]⌘ 1/
⇣
µV [t]f (IV [t])l 1
⌘
(14)
where the inverse of x [t] measures the development cost according to (8b).17 If u > 1/x there would be
unbounded R&D demand for foregone consumption. If u < 1/x , there would be unbounded demand for
patents. With well functioning markets, equilibrium R&D investment IV must be such that the price of fresh
patents equals the cost of capital-good innovation and determines the instantaneous rate of innovation,
Vˆ ⌘ V˙
V
= µV f 1IlV , (15)
17The research input of IV generates V˙ patents at time t. So, the present-time cost of developing a patent (or a new design) is
measured by IV /V˙ = 1/x in terms of (8b).
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using (8b). With the identity of V =Vp+Vnp, the innovation rate Vˆ is a weighted average of the growth rate
Vˆp of patented durables and the growth rate Vˆnp of unpatented durables. That is, Vˆ = zVˆp+(1 z )Vˆnp with
Vˆp ⌘ V˙pVp and Vˆnp ⌘
V˙np
Vnp , where the fraction of patented durables z ⌘ VP/V and the fraction of unpatented
durables 1 z =Vnp/V evolve over time until the economy is in a steady state. The patent length T plays a
role in the motions of z , Vp, and Vnp. We describe their relationships in what follows.
2.4.2 Patent length and the dynamic evolution from patented to unpatented durables
First, with an active R&D sector, there are V˙ [t] patents issued at a point in time and these newly issued
patents will expire at a future date, t+T . That is, it holds that V˙ [t] = V˙np[t+T ] and this equality relation
implies V˙np[t] = V˙ [t T ]. As such, V˙np[t] is pre-determined by previous innovations at a time of t T . With
a finite patent length, the growth rates of unpatented and patented durables are therefore given by18
Vˆnp[t] =
✓
1
1 z [t]
◆
Vˆ [t T ]e 
´ t 
t T Vˆ [t]dt (16a)
Vˆp[t] =
✓
1
z [t]
◆
(Vˆ [t] Vˆ [t T ]e 
´ t 
t T Vˆ [t]dt) (16b)
where t  is asymptotically close to t and
´ t 
t T Vˆ [t]dt represents the cumulative sum of innovation rates
between t T and t. Differentiating z ⌘ VpV with respect to time t yields
z˙ [t] = (Vˆp[t] Vˆ [t])z [t] (17)
As indicated, z˙ > 0 if the growth rate of patented durables, Vˆp , exceeds the innovation rate, Vˆ . If it is the
case, there is an increase in the fraction of patented durables and a decrease in the fraction of unpatented
durables. From (17), z is driven by the two motions of Vˆ and Vˆp in terms of (17). These motions underlie
the patent-created innovating mechanism in a dynamic general-equilibrium context. This mechanism con-
tributes to total factor productivity (TFP) by introducing new types of capital goods, but it can also induce a
technical distortion to offset the TFP enhancement to some extent. The following analysis will unfold this
problem.
2.5 Innovation and monopoly distortion
In the model patents incentivize innovation of new capital goods by creating monopoly distortions. In this
environment, the relative prices of patented and unpatented capital goods are distorted and prevent society
from adopting the technically optimal mix of durables, although individual final goods producers always
choose their cost-minimizing techniques for whatever relative prices. This problem is missing in almost all
endogenous growth models where patents are presumed to be infinitely lived.
18(16a) can be obtained using: (i) V˙np[t] = V˙ [t T ], (ii) Vˆnp[t]⌘ V˙np[t]Vnp[t] =
V˙ [t T ]
V [t T ]⇥ V [t T ]V [t] ⇥ V [t]Vnp[t] , (iii)
V [t]
Vnp =
1
1 z [t] , and (iv)V [t] =
V [t T ]e
´ t 
t T Vˆ [t]dt , where the upper bound t  is asymptotically close to t. Then with (16a) and the identity Vˆ = zVˆp+(1 z )Vˆnp,
(16b) holds evidently.
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2.5.1 Monopoly-distorted TFP
Consider symmetries of capital goods permitting to use Xnp for X [i], i 2 [0,Vnp] and Xp for X [i], i 2 (Vnp,V ].
From (11) and (12), the final goods production function can reduce to :
Y = z(AhL)1 aKa (18)
where A⌘V 1es(1 a) =V a(e 1)(1 a) is an endogenous technology term, z(Ah)1 a ( = zV ae 1 h1 a ) is a measure
of TFP, and z is the monopoly-induced distortion on R&D-driven TFP defined as
z= z[z ] =
 
h1 ez +1 z 1/s
(h ez +1 z )a (19)
It can be verified that z bears a convex relationship with z 2 [0,1], has a local minimum at z = e([1 
( 1h )
e ] 1  ( 1h )[1  ( 1h )e 1] 1)> 0, and rises to one if z moves to either end of its domain. This relationship
is demonstrated in Figure 1, which presumes a = 1/3 and s = 1.75 or 2.00.19. Note that the socially
optimal technique for final goods production ought to involve symmetric use of all available capital goods in
accordance with (4). But under the patent regime the relative prices of patented and unpatented durables are
distorted. This makes use of capital goods biased toward those that are marginal cost priced. This bias gives
rise to a socially inefficient technique in production of final goods and translates into an economy-wide drag
on the level of TFP (due to z(Ah)1 a < (Ah)1 a ). Thus, TFP fails to attain its potential level (= (Ah)1 a ),
unless patents are either infinitely lived (T ! •) or non-existent (T = 0). In the latter case, the R&D sector
must vanish, however. From (18), the instantaneous growth rate of total factor productivity is determined by
ˆTFP= ˆTFPR&D+(1 a)hˆ; ˆTFPR&D = zˆ+(1 a)Aˆ (20)
where (1 a)Aˆ =   ae 1 Vˆ . As indicated, the overall TFP growth rate is decomposed into ˆTFPR&D (the
growth rate of R&D-driven TFP) and (1 a)hˆ (the exogenous growth rate of non-R&D-driven TFP). The
R&D-driven TFP growth rate, ˆTFPR&D, implies that while invention of new types of capital goods con-
tribute productivity growth, this growth may be weakened by more monopoly distortions if z falls. In this
paper, therefore, changes in TFP can result from R&D, or monopoly distortions, or exogenous productiv-
ity factors. This feature will prove conductive later in calibrating the model to a real-world economy, as
compared to Jones and Williams (2000), for instance.
2.5.2 Monopoly-distorted factor income shares
Next, let us look at how factor income shares are influenced by monopoly distortions. Consider the flow of
gross capital income
´ V
0 p[i]X [i]di that can be decomposed into aggregate (gross) rental income (r+d )K and
aggregate profit P=Vpp = zVp , where zV is the number of patented firms. The labor share is wLY = 1 a ,
19Recall that 0 < s < 1a , e =
1
1 sa > 1, h =
1
sa > 1, and 0 < z < 1. Given these parameters and (19), if z = 1, z =
h(1 e)/s+ea = 1 due to (1  e)/s + ea = 0. As well, if z = 0, the result of z = 1 is self-evident. Certainly, both z and z are
determined simultaneously in equilibrium.
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Figure 1: The convex relationship between z and z =Vp/V
so parameter a represents the gross capital income share and must satisfy the identity relationship that
a = PY +
(r+d )K
Y , where the shares of profit and gross rental income are given by
20
P
Y
= ma, with m= z (h 1)
(1 z )he +zh 2 (0, 1) (21a)
(r+d )K
Y
= (1 m)a (21b)
Note that the fraction term m determines how much of the the gross capital income share, a , goes to mo-
nopolistic profits. Certainly, (1 m)a is the remaining capital income share going for rents and capital
depreciation, subject to the relative magnitude of r and d . Since ∂m∂z = h
e > 0, the profit share, P/Y , rises if
patented firms account for a larger fraction in the entire capital goods sector. If this fraction is one (z = 1),
the profit share reaches its maximum at
⇣
h 1
h
⌘
a and the gross rental share drops to its minimum at ah . To
the contrary, z = 0 (no monopoly) dictates that the entire capital share, a , goes for gross rents.
2.6 Patent regime’s steady-state dynamic system
The patent-regime economy is in the steady state by assumption. Let us close the patent regime model
by presenting its balanced-growth dynamic system and its core variables’ steady state equilibrium in this
20Aggregate profit is P = zVp = (h   1)(r+ d )zVXp based on (9) and (10) and aggregate rental income is (r+ d )K = (r+
d )VXnp
 
h ez +1 z  according to (12). Hence, using (11), the ratio of P/[(r+ d )K] is determined by z (h 1)z+(1 z )he . Using this
ratio, we can solve the identity a = PY +
(r+d )K
Y for (21a) and (21b).
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subsection. Later the economy will be perturbed at time t = 0 by replacing the patent regime with an
intertemporal-bounty (IB) regime. To differentiate one regime from the other other, let us label the initial
patent steady state with subscript 0 and a new IB steady state with subscript 1. From (8a), (8b), (3), and (13),
the patent-regime dynamic system on a balanced-growth path is represented by four ordinary differential
equations:21
K˙0[t] = (1  sV0)Y0[t] C0[t] dK0[t] (22a)
V˙0[t] = µV0[t]f (sV0Y0[t])l (22b)
C˙0[t] =C0
✓
r r
g
+n
◆
(22c)
u˙0[t] = r0u0[t] p0[t](1  e (r0 pˆ0)T ) (22d)
where Y0[t] = z0(A0[t]h[t]L[t])1 aKa0 and p0[t] = am0Y0[t]/(z0V0[t]) according to (18) and (21a). On the
balanced-growth path, the non-stationary variables includingK0[t],V0[t],Y0[t],C0[t], u0[t], and p0[t] continue
to grow over time at their constant growth rates. In contrast, the stationary variables such as interest rate
r0, R&D investment rate sV0, capital investment rate sK0, and patented durables share z0 all stay unchanged
over time. For those non-stationary variables, their constant steady-state growth rates are given as follows
(see Appendix A for derivations):
Kˆ0 = Yˆ0 = Cˆ0 = qK(n+ hˆ) (23a)
Vˆ0 = qV (n+ hˆ); Aˆ0 = qA(n+ hˆ); ˆTFP= (1 a)(Aˆ+ hˆ) (23b)
uˆ0 = pˆ0 = qu(n+ hˆ)⌘ (qK qV )(n+ hˆ) (23c)
where each of terms qV , qA, qK and qu is a structural composite of growth-relevant parameters for a specific
variable or for a set of specific variables, as given below,
qV =
l
1 f  l/[es(1 a)] ; qA =
l
(1 f)[es(1 a)] l ; qK = qA+1= (
1 f
l
)qV . (24)
To facilitate subsequent discussions, let us call these structural composites “growth kernels,” which readily
translate the population growth rate n+ hˆ into a relevant variable’s long-run growth rate. For instance,
qV (n+ hˆ) is the long-run innovation rate of V , qA(n+ hˆ) the long-run growth rate of A, and qK(n+ hˆ)
the long-run growth rate of K, Y , and C.22 Certainly, on per capita terms, qK(n+ hˆ)  n (= qAn+ qKhˆ)
determines the long-run growth rate of k, y, and c due to kˆ = Kˆ n, yˆ= Yˆ  n and cˆ= Cˆ n. As for a fresh
patent’s price u and a patented firm’s profit flow p , they share the same growth kernel represented by qu (or
qK minus qV ), and thereby their long-run growth rate is given by qu(n+ hˆ) or (qK qV )(n+ hˆ), as indicated
by (23c). This actually makes intuitive sense, because final output growth (qK(n+ hˆ)) expands the market
for capital goods, whereas the arrival of newer capital goods (qV (n+ hˆ)) dilutes the market.
Note that the structural parameters (a , s , e l , f ) that form the growth kernels are from the production
functions of final goods and technical designs of capital goods. The population growth rate n and the
21By Leibniz’s rule, differentiating (13) on a balanced growth path yields the differential equation of (22d).
22In (23b), the long-run TFP growth rate, ˆTFP, is obtained by setting zˆ= 0 in (20).
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exogenous productivity growth rate hˆ are parameters, too. Therefore, the long-run innovation rate Vˆ0 and all
other long-run growth rates mentioned above are exogenous, independent of the size of the economy and
the patent length. Also, as noted earlier (see Footnote 16), a bounded, positive long-run innovation rate, Vˆ0,
requires that f be less than the upper bound f¯ (= 1 l/[es(1 a)] < 1). Once Vˆ0 is bounded, all other
non-stationary variables are bounded as well.
In the model ongoing growth makes non-stationary variables unbounded and grow exponentially at
different paces in the long run. These features call for multiple normalization factors to transform non-
stationary into stationary variables. The “growth-kernel powered labor forces” defined by (hL)qK , (hL)qV ,
(hL)qA and (hL)qK qV provide a systemic way to build such normalization factors. For instance, K, V , A
and u can be normalized to eK ⌘ K/(hL)qK , eV ⌘V/(hL)qV , eA⌘ A/(hL)qA , and eu ⌘ u/(hL)qu , respectively.
In so doing, each variable with tilde is a bounded, measurable scale-adjusted quantity, because eˆx[t] = xˆ[t] 
qx(n+ hˆ) = 0, x 2 {K,V, A, u} as t goes to infinity.23 We close the patent regime model by deriving the
long-run steady-state equilibria of a set of scale-adjusted variables for further analysis (see Appendix A for
detailed derivations): eK0 = eA0✓ z0sK0d +qK(n+ hˆ)
◆1/(1 a)
(25a)
eV0 = "sV0✓ z0sK0d +qK(n+ hˆ)
◆a/(1 a)✓ µ
qV (n+ hˆ)
◆1/l#qV
(25b)
eC0 = (1  s0)eY0 (25c)
eu0 = am0z0
 eY0eV0
! 
1  e (r0 Yˆ0+Vˆ0)T
r0  Yˆ0+Vˆ0
!
(25d)
where
sK0 = a(1 m0)
 
d +(n+ hˆ)+ Aˆ0
r0+d
!
, (25e)
sV0 = Vˆ0
✓
am0
z0
◆ 
1  e (r0 Yˆ0+Vˆ0)T
r0  Yˆ0+Vˆ0
!
, (25f)
r0 = r+ g[qAn+qKhˆ], (25g)
z0 = 1  e Vˆ0T , (25h)
In the above equations, our earlier definitions suffice to recognize that eA0 = eV 1/(es(1 a))0 is a scale-adjusted
technology term, eY0 = z0eA1 a0 eKa0 is a scale-adjusted GDP, z0 is a monopoly-induced technical distortion on
TFP (see (19), s0 ⌘ sK0+ sV0 is the steady-state saving rate, a(1 m0) is the gross rental income share, and
am0 is the profit share (see (21a).24 On the initial balanced growth path, a patented firm’s scale-adjusted
profit flow is ep0 = am0z0 ⇣ eY0eV0⌘, and with the finite patent length T and the discount factor 1 e (r0 Yˆ0+Vˆ0)Tr0 Yˆ0+Vˆ0 , eu0 is a
23Similar normalization factors are used in Eicher and Turnovsky (2001).
24A=V
1
es(1 a) implies eA= eV 1es(1 a) using A= eA(hL)qA , V = eV (hL)qV , and qVes(1 a)  qA = 0; see (24).
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measure of the scale-adjusted private value (shadow price) of a potential innovation according to (25d). This
private value represents a discounted sum of the profit stream earned by a newly issued patent. It permits
to derive the R&D intensity sV0 in (25f) as shown in Appendix A. Equations (25a) - (25h) imply the roles
of patent length (T ) and patent-created monopoly distortions (z0, m0). For instance, if patent length T is
set to zero, then: (i) the monopolistically competitive sector vanishes (z0 = 0); (ii) there is no TFP growth
(Vˆ0 = Aˆ0 = 0) despite that there is no monopoly distortion on TFP (z0 = 1, see Figure 1); (iii) the profit
share is zero due to m0 = 0, so are the R&D intensity (sV0 = 0), the private value of a potential innovation
(eu0 = 0), and the scale-adjusted knowledge stock (eV0 = 0). In other words, if the patent system is removed
and if there is no other decentralized market mechanism to support R&D investment, the model becomes a
non-innovative economy can only invest in old capital goods endowed by history.
The paper is aimed at examining whether or not it is socially desirable to replace the entire patent regime
with an intertemporal bounty regime that will be laid out later in Section 4. To this end, it is conductive to
evaluate the patent regime and the proposed alternative, respectively, against the economy’s Pareto optimal-
ity. The next section evaluates the patent regime.
3 Evaluating Patent Regime against Pareto Optimality
How efficient is a decentralized patent-regime economy in allocating resources? To answer this question,
we need look at the economy’s Pareto optimal allocation as a benchmark.
3.1 Pareto optimality
The Pareto optimal allocation can be obtained by maximizing household’s lifetime utility, subject to the
economy’s initial resource endowments (K0, V0, L0 = 1) and technological constraints. Hence, the social
planner optimization problem is given by
max
c, IK , IV
•ˆ
0
c1 g  1
1  g e
 (r n)tdt, s.t.: (26a)
Y = (AhL)1 aKa =C+ IK + IV , C = cL (26b)
K˙ = IK dK, K[0] = K0; V˙ = µV f IlV , V [0] =V0 (26c)
where h[t] = ehˆt and L[t] = ent as under the patent regime. With no market imperfections in such a centralized
economy, we need to set z at z ⇤ = 0 and z at z⇤ = 1.25 This makes final goods production function (18)
reduce to (26b). We can solve the social planner problem for c, IK , and IV , which can then translate into s,
sK , sV , and u respectively.26 Using these Pareto-optimal investment rates, we can derive the Pareto-optimal
scale-adjusted stocks of capital and knowledge in the same way as we did earlier for the patent regime.
25Hereafter, a variable with an asterisk indicates a centralized economy’s steady-state equilibrium.
26As a standard procedure, one can obtain the socially optimal solution by maximizing the Hamiltonian,
H ⌘
✓
c1 g  1
1  g
◆
e (r n)t +yK ·
⇣
V
1
es (hL)1 aKa   cL  IV  dK
⌘
+yV ·µV f IlV
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Also, as we have analyzed, the long-run growth rates of some non-stationary variables are parametrized by
their associated growth kernels and the population growth rate (see (23a) - (23c)). Certainly, these long-run
growth rates also hold for the centralized economy; that is, Kˆ⇤ = Yˆ ⇤ = Cˆ⇤ = qK(n+ hˆ), Vˆ ⇤ = qV (n+ hˆ),
Aˆ⇤ = qA(n+ hˆ), and uˆ⇤ = pˆ⇤ = (qK qV )(n+ hˆ). However, except for the real interest rate r, the centralized
economy has a different set of steady-state equilibria given below:
eK⇤ = eA⇤✓ s⇤K
d +n+ hˆ+ Aˆ⇤
◆1/(1 a)
(27a)
eV ⇤ = "s⇤V ✓ s⇤Kd +qK(n+ hˆ)
◆a/(1 a)✓ µ
qV (n+ hˆ)
◆1/l#qV
(27b)
eC⇤ = (1  s⇤)eY ⇤ (27c)
eu⇤ = 1
es
 eY ⇤eV ⇤
!✓
l
r⇤   Yˆ ⇤+(1 f)Vˆ ⇤
◆
(27d)
where
s⇤K = a ·
 
d +(n+ hˆ)+ Aˆ⇤
r⇤+d
!
(27e)
s⇤V = Vˆ
⇤
✓
1
es
◆✓
l
r⇤   Yˆ ⇤+(1 f)Vˆ ⇤
◆
(27f)
r⇤ = r0, z ⇤ = 0 (27g)
In these socially optimal equations, eY ⇤ = eA⇤1 a eK⇤a , eA⇤ = eV ⇤1/(es(1 a)) and s⇤K + s⇤V = s⇤. Equation (27d)
merit special attention.27 There, the term 1es =
V
Y
∂Y
∂V =
V
TFP
∂TFP
∂V measures the elasticity of final output
Y or total factor productivity TFP with respect to the measure of variety V in terms of (18), while the
term lr⇤ Yˆ ⇤+(1 f)Vˆ ⇤ is the discount factor that takes into account the externalities of knowledge spillovers
f and research congestion l . Thus in this steady-state centralized economy, eu⇤is the scale-adjusted social
value of an individual innovation and eu⇤eV ⇤the scale-adjusted social value of aggregate innovations, each in
present-value term. Note that the term of e = 11 sa (with 0< s < 1/a) is the price elasticity of demand for
individual capital goods. This implies that if “innovative” capital goods are very similar (i.e. e approaches
infinity), then the social value eu⇤ of an innovation approaches zero due to 1es ! 0. In this polar case, the
socially optimal R&D intensity s⇤V drops to zero, so is the scale-adjusted socially optimal knowledge capital.
where yK and yV are Lagrangian multipliers.
27In a centralized economy, there are no bounty claims. But in this economy the shadow price u⇤ of innovations must satisfy
u⇤ = s
⇤
VY ⇤
V˙ ⇤ =
s⇤VY ⇤
Vˆ ⇤V ⇤ , which implies eu⇤ = s⇤V eY ⇤Vˆ ⇤eV ⇤ using u = eu(hL)qu , Y = eY (hL)qK , V = eV (hL)qV , and qu = qK   qV according to
(23c). Replacing s⇤V with (27f), we can obtain (27d).
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3.2 Patent regime is suboptimal
To show that a patent-regime economy is always suboptimal, we use (25a) - (25h) and (27a) - (27g) to derive
the following relative ratios: eK0eK⇤ =
 eV0eV ⇤
!1/[es(1 a)]✓
z0sK0
s⇤K
◆1/(1 a)
(28a)
eV0eV ⇤ =
✓
sV0
s⇤V
◆qV ✓z0sK0
s⇤K
◆aqV /(1 a)
(28b)
eu0eV0eu⇤eV ⇤ =
✓
sV0
s⇤V
◆ eK0eK⇤
!a eV0eV ⇤
! 1
es
(28c)
sK0
s⇤K
= 1 m0 (28d)
sV0
s⇤V
=
✓
am0/z0
1/(es)
◆ 
1  e (r0 Yˆ0+Vˆ0)T
1
!✓
1/(r0  Yˆ0+Vˆ0)
1/[r0  Yˆ0+(1 f)Vˆ0]
◆✓
1
l
◆
(28e)
It is clear from (28a) that as long as there is a non-zero patent length (T > 0), patent-regime agents must
underinvest in the capital stock (because sK0s⇤K < 1 due to 0 < m0 < 1). The market mechanism is straight-
forward: patent-created monopolies raise capital-good prices above marginal costs and decrease the market
incentive to build the stock of capital. Further, as we had mentioned earlier, there is a monopoly-induced
technical distortion, denoted by z0, this can decrease the economy’s total factor productivity (see (19)). As a
result, through the sK0  cum  z0 channel, the patent-regime capital and knowledge stocks must fall below
their respective long-run Pareto optimal levels, as indicated by (28a) and (28b).
Further, through the sV0 channel, the patent-regime capital and knowledge stocks can be affected as well.
However, this channel is more complicated. For purposes of exposition, we break the R&D-intensity ratio
sV0/s⇤V of equation (28e) into four sources:
(i) From the first parenthesized term, a patent-protected monopolist’s valuation of an innovation is al-
ways less than social valuation at any point in time; i.e. am0/z0 < 1/(es).28 This is a static valuation
distortion, making patent-regime agents underinvest in R&D. (ii) From the second term, patent-regime
agents underinvest in R&D again, because a finite patent length is always too short to reflect an innovative
durable’s permanent contribution to household’s welfare. This is a dynamic valuation distortion inherent in
any patent system that rewards an innovation only for a finite duration. The static and dynamic valuation
distortions combine to create the well-known “social-surplus appropriability” problem. (iii) The third term
represents a positive technical externality, making patent-regime agents underinvest in R&D, because they
do not internalize knowledge spillovers (0 < f < 1) in their private R&D decisions (see (8b)). (iv) Lastly,
28The private valuation of a patented capital good is am0/z0 = a
⇣
h 1
(1 z )he+zh
⌘
=
⇣
zh
(1 z )he+zh
⌘
·a/e according to (21a) and
h = e/(e 1) > 1. Since zh(1 z )he+zh < 1 and a < 1s from (4), the private valuation must be unambiguously less than the social
valuation.
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from the fourth term, 1/l is greater than one, due to the research congestion externality (l < 1) (see (8b)).
For this negative technical externality, patent-regime agents overinvest in R&D. In contrast to patent-regime
agents, the social planner internalizes both positive and negative externalities.
The above analysis indicates multiple distortions that tend to cause underinvestment in R&D in a de-
centralized patent-regime economy, whereas only the research-congestion distortion tends to the opposite.
Empirical estimates seem to suggest that the research-congestion distortion alone should not dominate.29
Thus, compared to the Pareto optimum, the patent regime should tend to have a smaller R&D intensity (sV0)
and should tend to build a smaller stock of capital and knowledge, respectively, on account of (28a) and
(28b). Another important feature that merits attention is that in general the Pareto-optimal social value eu⇤ of
an innovation may or may not exceed its patent-regime private eu0, because each of these two values is tied
to the cost of value-created R&D in a general equilibrium framework. This is in contrast to previous partial
equilibrium patent-prize studies. But it is clear that if the research congestion externality (l < 1) does not
dominate, the Pareto social value of aggregate innovations are greater than their corresponding social value
according to eu0eV0eu⇤eV ⇤ < 1 (see (28c)).30
Simulation of the model later will lend support to our analysis here. Regardless, a patent system is
apparently suboptimal, with no hope to duplicate the social planner’s optimal solution.31
4 Switching to the Intertemporal Bounty Regime
Can a decentralized economy attain the Pareto optimum characterized by (27a) - (27g) if the patent regime
is replaced with an alternative that rewards technological innovation with intertemporal bounties payable on
the observed marginal-cost sales of bountiable goods? This is the central question of the paper. To facilitate
the analysis, I firstly describe institutional arrangements for the intertemporal bounty (IB) regime to be a
patent replacement.
4.1 Institutional arrangements
A feasible intertemporal bounty regime requires the following institutional arrangements:32
First, any bountiable innovation of a differentiated capital good must be freely licensed. This creates
a free entry condition to establish a perfectly competitive market for bountiable durables that must sell at
marginal cost. That is, p= r+d with h = 1 (see (10)).
Second, the innovator is rewarded with a perpetual bounty claim to an infinite stream of future bounties,
payable on the ex post marginal-cost sales of a specific bountiable capital good at a rate determined by the
29For instance, Jones and Williams (1998) find that an innovating economy’s socially optimal R&D investment is at least four
time greater than actual spending.
30Note that at any point in time some there are newly issued patents plus vintage patents that have either expired or not yet
expired. But eu0 is the scale-adjusted private value of a new patent. Therefor, eu0eV0 has overestimated the actual private value of
aggregate innovations.
31For instance, if the patent length goes to infinity (T ! •), z0 ! 1, z0 ! 1, m0 ! (h   1)/h = 1/e , and am0/z01/(es) ! sa < 1.
These changes only mitigate to some extent the monopoly-created distortions. Adjusting the patent breadth (equivalent to changing
the markup rate, h) cannot fix the sub-optimality problem, either.
32See Footnote 11 for earlier discussions of the IB system.
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government. The number of bountiable goods is the same as the number of bounty claims. Denote by b the
bounty rate. Then given the ex post market sales pX of the bountiable good, the bounty flow, denoted by
b, is paid to the holder of a bounty claim at a point in time based on b = b pX . In this way, the prize for
innovation is dynamically amortized in an infinite time domain as periodic bounties b, subject to the bounty
rate b and observed market sales pX . The IB system therefore releases the burden of estimating the size
of prizes. Of course, the government still needs to estimate the bounty rate b , which we will show how
to calculate using mostly aggregate data. As discussed in the introductory section, the IB system is more
practical than those “once and for all” prize systems from the patent-prize economics literature.
Third, the government collects taxes from households to make bounty payments. For simplicity, the
paper presumes a non-distortionary lump-sum tax available to fund such intertemporal bounties. The tax-
financed bounty payment must be creditable so as to form an active asset market for tradeable bounty
claims.33 The equilibrium price u of a typical bounty claim must therefore reflect the discounted present
value of an infinite stream of future bounties. Thus the equilibrium bounty-claim price, u , informs the
government and private agents of the private value of a bountiable innovation (blueprint). Households are
the owners of bounty claims. So, the collected lump-sum tax must return to the household sector.
Fourth, the intertemporal-bounty regime grandfathers all those previously innovated durables whose
patents are still legally live at the moment of the regime switch, which occurs at t = 0 in the modeled
economy with live patents amounting to Vp[0] = z0V [0]. Thus, at t = 0, the government needs to issue
z0V [0] bounty claims immediately, and variable z would henceforth need to be redefined as the fraction of
bountied (not patented) durables. Eliminating the grandfather clause would allow bounties and patents to
co-exist before these patents expire legally. This would complicate the model and delay the gain to society
from removing monopolies.
Under the above arrangements, all capital goods, either bountied or non-bountied, sell at the same
marginal cost. This simplifies calculation of bounties. The government’s aggregate bounty payments, de-
noted by B, at a point in time are equal to B = baYz = b (r+ d )Kz , where aY = (r+ d )K is aggregate
capital spending and aYz is aggregate markets sales of bountiable goods. That is, the government needs
to collect from households a lump-sum tax equal to B. Certainly, the bounty flow to an individual bounty
claim is determined by b = B/zV = baY/V , where zV is the number of bounty claims. In what follows
the patent-regime model we have developed earlier will be switched to a bounty-regime model. This can be
done by changing some parameters.
4.2 Dynamic system under the intertemporal bounty regime
Now, for the modeled economy to enter an intertemporal-bounty regime, we change some parameters that
characterize the patent-regime model. To this end, the markup of h > 1 is changed to h = 1, the monopoly
profit flow p is replaced with the bounty flow b, and a finite patent length T < • is re-parametrized as
an infinite bounty length with T ! •.34 In so doing, we can parametrize a regime switch from patents
33In practice, a bounty claim can split into shares to make it more liquid on the market.
34The bounty regime requires T ! • because bounty claims are perpetual. For the flow budget constraint (2), per-capita lump-
sum tax needs to be included so that a˙ = (r n)a+w  c  BL , where asset stock a (including physical capital and bounty claims)
earns net capital income (consisting of the bounty flow) at an interest rate r on risk-free bonds. With no uncertainty, bonds and
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to intertemporal bounties. This regime switch pushes the economy off the initial patent-regime balanced-
growth path defined by (22a) - (22d) and gives rise to a bounty-regime dynamic system that evolves over
time t 2 [0, •) as given below:
K˙[t] = (1  sV [t])Y [t] C[t] dK[t] (29a)
V˙ [t] = µV [t]f (sV [t]Y [t])l (29b)
C˙[t] =C[t](
r[t] r
g
+n) (29c)
u˙ [t] = r[t]u [t] b[t] (29d)
where Y [t], sV [t], r[t] and b[t] are determined by
Y [t] = (A[t]h[t]L[t])1 aK[t]a (30a)
sV [t] = u [t]1/(1 l )(µV [t]f )1/(1 l )/Y [t] (30b)
r[t] =
aY [t]
K[t]
 d (30c)
b[t] = baY [t]/V [t] (30d)
z [t] = 1  (1 z0)e 
´ t
0 Vˆ [t]dt , z [0] = z0, z [•] = 1 (30e)
This is a nonlinear dynamic system of four first-order ordinary differential equations. This system starts at
t = 0, driving the economy to transition to a new balanced-growth path in the long run. It contains new
elements that warrant attention in some respects:
First, in contrast to (22d), (29d) is a no-arbitrage condition applying to infinitely lived bounty claims,
where u [t] is reinterpreted as the market price of a bounty claim (not a patent) and b[t] is the bounty flow to
the holder of a typical bounty claim. Second, the bounty flow b[t] is based on the government-determined
bounty rate b and the observed market size of a bountied durable, aY [t]/V [t], according to (30d). Third, the
TFP distortion term z jumps to one as h is set to one at the moment of the regime switch, thereby raising
TFP to the distortion-free level, as implied by (30a). Fourth, using (14) and sVY = IV , one can readily
derive (30b) to determine the R&D investment rate sV [t]. Fifth, setting m= 0 (due to h = 1) in (21b) yields
equation (30c) for the interest rate r[t] at any moment. Lastly, (30e) determines the fraction z [t] of bountied
durables. This is a state variable evolving to one in the long run, subject to the instantaneous innovation
Vˆ = V˙/V determined by the the dynamic system. But this state variable does not enter the dynamic system,
since bountied and unbountied durables are equally priced.35
To examine how the regime switch is to impact the economy, we must solve the dynamic system of
other types of assets are perfect substitutes. Atomistic household treat the lump sum tax B as given in their intertemporal decisions.
Also, we need to re-interpret pp (pnp) as the price of bountied (unbountied) durables, and Vp (Vnp) as the number of bountied
(unbountied) durables.
35Perpetual bounty claims implies V˙p = V˙ and Vˆp = VVp
V˙
V = Vˆ/z . Therefore, (17) needs to be changed to z˙ = (1 z )Vˆ , which
solves for (30e).
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(29a) - (29d) for a nonlinear stable manifold in the two-dimensional state space of capital and knowledge
stocks. This is tantamount to computing the transition paths of K[t], V [t],C[t] and u [t], t 2 [0, •). But these
variables are unbounded in the long run. Thus as under the initial patent regime, the bounty-regime dynamic
system must be transformed into a stationary one.
4.3 Normalization of bounty-regime dynamic system
Normalizing the dynamic system of (29a) - (29d) requires four normalization factors, as we did for the
patent regime. More details are given in what follows.
4.3.1 Growth kernel-powered labor forces as normalization factors
Note that long-run growth rates are regime-independent in the model. They are parametrized by their
associated growth kernels (qV , qA, qK , qu ), the exogenous growth rate of efficiency (eˆ) and the pop-
ulation growth rate (n) in accordance with (23a) - (23c) and (24). As under the patent regime, these
growth kernel-powered labor forces ((hL)qK , (hL)qV , (hL)qA , (hL)qu ) serve as normalization factors such
that eK = K/(hL)qK , eV = V/(hL)qV , eA = A/(hL)qA , eC = C/(hL)qK , eY = Y/(hL)qK , eu = u/(hL)qu , andeb = b/(hL)qu .36 These scale-adjusted quantities (eK, eV , eA, eC, eY , eu , eb) are stationary and measurable as
t goes to infinity. Using this normalization approach and noting how those growth kernels are interrelated in
terms of (24), we can transform (29a) - (29d) into a stationary dynamic system as given below:
e˙K[t] = f1[~w[t]]⌘ sK [t]eY [t]  (d +qK(n+ hˆ))eK[t] (31a)
e˙V [t] = f2[~w[t]]⌘ µeV [t]f (sV [t]eY [t])l  qV (n+ hˆ)eV [t] (31b)
e˙C[t] = f3[~w[t]]⌘ eC[t](r[t] rg   (qAn+qKhˆ)) (31c)
e˙u [t] = f4[~w[t]]⌘ r[t]eu [t] eb[t]  (qK qV )(n+ hˆ)eu [t] (31d)
subject to eK[0] = eK0, eV [0] = eV0; eK[•] = eK1, eV [•] = eV1, eC[•] = eC1, eu [•] = eu1 (31e)
where ~w[t]⌘ (eK[t], eV [t], eC[t], eu [t]) is a vector of four unknown scale-adjusted quantities. Some other vari-
ables that depend on ~w[t] are scale-adjusted final output eY [t], scale-adjusted bounty flow eb[t], capital invest-
ment rate sK [t], R&D investment rate sV [t], interest rate r[t] and bountiable fraction z [t]. Their relationships
are given by the following static equilibrium conditions:
eY [t] = eA[t]1 a eK[t]a , with eA[t] = eV 1/(es(1 a)) (32a)
36From (30d), the instantaneous growth rate of bounty flow b is bˆ[t] = Yˆ [t]  Vˆ [t] and bˆ[•] = (qK  qV )(n+ hˆ) ⌘ qu (n+ hˆ) in
steady state. Therefore, (hL)qu serves as a normalization factor for b, as in the case of u .
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eb[t] = baeY [t]/eV [t] (32b)
sK [t] = (1  sV [t]) 
eC[t]eY [t] (32c)
sV [t] = (eu [t] ·µeV [t]f )1/(1 l )/eY [t] (32d)
r[t] =
aeY [t]eK[t]  d (32e)
z [t] = 1  (1 z0)e 
´ t
0 (eˆV [t]+qV (n+hˆ))dt , z [0] = z0, z [•] = 1 (32f)
Equation (32f) results from (30e) by replacing the innovation rate Vˆ with eˆV +qV (n+ hˆ) due toV = eV (hL)qV ,
where eˆV = 0 in the long run. The normalized system features two state variables (eK, eV ) and two jump
variables (eC, eu). These two state variables – capital and knowledge stocks – are predetermined at any point
in time and must evolve smoothly over time, whereas the two jump variables – aggregate consumption and
price of bounty claim – are free to make a discrete change in response to shocks. The normalized system is
subject to two initial-value boundary conditions represented by eK[0] = eK0 and eV [0] = eV0 at t = 0 as well as
four other boundary conditions represented by eK[•] = eK1, eV [•] = eV1, eC[•] = eC1, and eu [•] = eu1 at t!•.37
This is a nonlinear two-point boundary value problem and can only be solved numerically. However, these
boundary conditions are subject to the government-determined bounty rate b . So, before we can proceed
to solve the boundary value problem in Section 5, we need to work out formulas for the government to
calculate the bounty rate.
4.3.2 Optimal bounty rate and the new balanced-growth path
At the outset, setting e˙K = e˙V = e˙C = e˙u = 0 in (31a) - (31d) allows us to solve for the steady-state boundary
conditions at t! • (see Appendix B for derivations):
eK1 = ✓ sK1d +qK(n+ hˆ)
◆1/(1 a) eA1 (33a)
eV1 = "sV1✓ sK1d +qK(n+ hˆ)
◆a/(1 a)✓ µ
qV (n+ hˆ)
◆1/l#qV
(33b)
eC1 = (1  s1)eY1 (33c)
eu1 = ba eY1eV1
!✓
1
r1+Vˆ1  Yˆ1
◆
(33d)
where
sK1 = s⇤K , zBountied1 = 1 (33e)
37Recall that we label a variable with subscript 0 (1) to indicate that variable associated with a balanced-growth patent (bounty)
regime.
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sV1 = baVˆ1
✓
1
r1+Vˆ1  Yˆ1
◆
(33f)
Note that eA1 = eV 1/(es(1 a))1 and eY1 = eA1 a1 eKa1 due to z = 1, while zBountied1 = z [•] = 1 in terms of (32f).
On this bounty-regime balanced-growth path, we have Kˆ1 = Cˆ1 = Yˆ1 = qK(n+ hˆ), Vˆ1 = qV (n+ hˆ), Aˆ1 =
qA(n+ hˆ), and uˆ1 = bˆ1 = (qK qV )(n+ hˆ). As such, these long-run growth rates are regime-independent, so
is the long-run interest rate (r1 = r0 = r⇤). As (33e) indicates, on a balanced-growth path, the decentralized
bounty regime always has the same physical capital investment rate as the social planner optimum (i.e.,
sK1 = s⇤K ; see (27e)), irrespective of the magnitude of the bounty rate b . However, in general, a bounty
regime does not have the same R&D investment rate as the Pareto optimal level (i.e., sV1 6= s⇤V ).38 Unless the
bounty rate, b , is set rightly to internalize the externalities of knowledge spillovers and research congestion,
the bounty regime will not see a R&D investment rate as socially optimal. This problem can be fixed,
however. By equalizing sV1 = s⇤V based on (27f) and (33f), we can derive a unique long-run Pareto optimal
bounty rate, denoted by b ⇤. The formula for b ⇤ is given by:
b ⇤ = l
e 1 ·
✓
r+Vˆ   Yˆ
r+(1 f)Vˆ   Yˆ
◆
(34)
where Vˆ =
  e 1
a
 
( ˆTFP  (1 a)hˆ) due to zˆ = 0 in (20). Hence, if b is replaced with b ⇤ in (33e), in
the long-run, the allocation of the bounty-regime economy’s foregone consumption as a fraction of final
output to R&D will be identical to what would otherwise obtain under social optimum. That is, sK1 = s⇤K
and sV1 = s⇤V must hold together along a balanced-growth path if b = b ⇤. Given these Pareto optimal
allocation of foregone consumption, a decentralized bounty-regime economy can completely mimic the
social planner’s Pareto optimum in the long run. For instance, if we compare (33a) - (33d) to (27a) - (27d),
it is easy to verify that eK1 = eK⇤, eV1 = eV ⇤, eA1 = eA⇤, eY1 = eY ⇤, eC1 = eC⇤, eu1 = eu⇤ and eu1eV1 = eu⇤eV ⇤along a
balanced growth path. Under this long-run Pareto optimal IB regime, the private value eu1 of a potential
innovation is navigated to its social value eu⇤, so is the private value eu1eV1 of aggregate innovations to its
social value eu⇤eV ⇤. Such a bounty regime can remove monopoly distortions to build a distortion-free capital
stock, while also permitting to fully internalize the externalities of knowledge spillovers (f ) and research
congestion (l ) to develop a long-run Pareto optimal knowledge stock.
The formula for b ⇤ requires information on an economy’s steady-state aggregate variables (innovation
rate Vˆ , final output growth rate Yˆ , and real interest rate r), parametrized externalities (knowledge spillovers
f and research congestion l ), and price elasticity of bountiable goods (e). Data of this sort is empirically
available. Long-run innovation rate Vˆ may be not readily available, but this problem can be overcome by
relating innovation rate Vˆ to TFP growth rate.
If the regime switch is only to remove monopoly distortions while maintaining the same R&D intensity
at the patent-regime steady state level, we can obtain a long-run suboptimal bounty rate, denoted by b ⇤⇤,
38There is a short cut to deriving either sK1 or sV1: setting m0 = 0 in (25e) yields sK1, while replacing am0Vˆ0 with baVˆ1 and
letting T ! • in (25f) yields sV1. In Appendix B, sK1 and sV1 are derived from steady-state equilibrium conditions.
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by equalizing sV0 and sV1 based on (25f) and (33f). The formula for this suboptimal bounty rate is given by
b ⇤⇤ = m
z
⇣
1  e (r Yˆ Vˆ )T
⌘
(35)
In addition to the same steady-state aggregate variables as for the calculation of b ⇤, the calculation of
b ⇤⇤requires the patent length (T ), the relative size of the patent-protected noncompetitive sector (z ), and the
monopoly-profit share (m) in aggregate capital income. Both b ⇤and b ⇤⇤will be computed in the next section
for the model calibrated to an innovating economy like the United States.
5 Numerical Analysis: Transition Paths & Welfare
This section presents numerical analysis based on the normalized bounty-regime dynamic system of (31a) -
(31d) along with its associated two-point boundary conditions given in (31e).
5.1 Calibration of the model and steady-state simulations
At the outset we use a set of benchmark parameters to calibrate the patent-regimemodel to the U.S. economy.
To this end, a systemic calibrating strategy is to solve equations (21a), (21b), (23a) and (25e)-(25g) for
parameters r , g , s , f , l and hˆ, given some empirically more reliable parameter values (such as n, d , a , T )
and some long-run stylized economic statistics.39 The remaining parameter, µ , in the innovation production
function can then be calibrated separately, as described later. Therefore, the calibrated model can deliver
a balanced-growth path that closely reflects the U.S. economy’s long-run stylized observations. The above
model calibration generates a benchmark set of parameters in Table 1. Some of them are identical to or close
to those used in previous calibration exercises, such as Jones and Williams (2000), Eicher and Turnovsky
(2001) and Grossmann et al. (2013). Descriptions of these benchmark parameters are given below.
Table 1: Benchmark parameters for model calibration
Production: a = 0.38 s = 1.80 µ = 0.14 f = 0.50 l = 0.50
Preference: r = 0.025 g = 2.0
Patent length: T = 20
Others parameters: d = 0.05 n= 0.01 hˆ= 0.012
Production and preference parameters In calibration of the final goods production function, the param-
eter of a is set equal to 0.38, meaning that the capital share in GDP is 38% and the labor share is 62%.
The parameter of s is set equal to 1.80, which reflects the substitutability of capital goods.. These two pa-
rameters lead to the price elasticity of demand for a typical capital good equal to 3.16 (= e = 1/(1 sa))
39For the U.S. economy, parameters n = 0.01, d = 0.05, a = 0.38 and T = 20 are relatively reliable or accurate. Its long-run
stylized statistics include the capital/output ratio (KY ⇡ 3), the annual rate of return on capital (r ⇡ 0.07), the annual growth rate of
per capital GDP (yˆ= Yˆ n⇡ 0.02), the annual TFP growth rate ( ˆTFP⇡ 1.25), the R&D intensity (sV ⇡ 0.025) and the consumption
rate (1  s= 1  sV   sK ⇡ 0.72).
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and the markup rate of about 1.46 (= h = 1sa ) for patented capital goods.
40 For the production function
of durable-good designs, the knowledge-spillover parameter, f , is set equal to 0.50, which is less than the
upper bound of f¯ = 1 l/(es(1 a)) ⇡ 0.86 (see Footnote 16); the research-congestion parameter, l ,
is also set equal to 0.50; and the research productivity parameter, µ , requires more elaboration and is to be
calibrated later. For the preference parameters, the rate of time preference, r , is constant at 0.025 per year
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is assumed to be 1/g = 0.5 (that is, g = 2).
Patent length and other parameters The patent length is set at T = 20 years in accordance with US and
WTO (World Trade Organization) patent policy. The rate of physical capital depreciation is set at d = 0.05
per year and the population of labor L[t] is set to grow annually at a constant rate of n = dLL = 0.01. As to
h[t], a non-R&D-driven efficiency index, is set to grow annually at a constant of hˆ = dhh = 0.012. While
this efficiency index is unobservable, the above-described calibration allows us to determine its value so as
to be consistent with the U.S. economy’s long-run growth rates of GDP, per GDP, and TFP. Note that the
time unit in the numerical analysis represents one year, since the chosen parameters such as r , n and hˆ are
in annual rates.
Remarks on R&D-driven TFP growth rate Note that the above-calibrated production parameters (a ,
s , f , l ) are sufficient to compute the model’s growth kernels in terms of (24). They are qV = 1.40 ,
qA = 0.40, and qK = 1.40. These growth kernels multiplied by the sum of n = 0.01 and hˆ = 0.012 can
deliver the plausible long-run real interest rate of r0 = 0.066 (see (25g)) and the following empirically
relevant long-run growth rates for the benchmark patent-regime U.S. economy: Vˆ0 = 0.031, Aˆ0 = 0.0087,
ˆTFP0 = (1 a)(Aˆ0+ hˆ) = 0.0128, ˆTFPR&D0 = (1 a)Aˆ0 = 0.0054, Kˆ = Yˆ = Cˆ = 0.031, and kˆ = yˆ= cˆ=
0.02. These figures say that the annual growth rates of GDP, per capita GDP, and TFP are about 3%, 2%, and
1.28%, respectively. Of the 1.28% growth rate of TFP, the R&D-driven portion accounts for 0.58 percent
points. That is, in the calibrated model, more than 50% of TFP growth is driven by non-R&D elements
such as learning by doing, management, etc., and as an echo of Comin (2004), R&D just contributes a small
portion to per capital GDP growth.41
Calibration of research productivity parameter µ Now let us return to calibration of the research pro-
ductivity parameter, µ . First, since labor supply L and non-R&D-driven efficiency index h are exogenous,
we chose L[0] = L0 = h[0] = h0 = 1. Second, since there is only one remaining parameter, µ , to be cali-
brated, we have a degree of freedom to choose either K0 or V0 at t = 0, and we chose V0 = 1, which implieseV0 =V0/(h0L0)qV = 1. Third, with eV0 = 1 and all the already-calibrated parameters, we can solve the eight
equations of (25a) - (25h) for parameter µ = 0.14 along with the other seven variables (eK0, eC0, eu0 sK0, sV0,
r0, z0). Using this procedure, parameter µ is calibrated at 0.14, as indicated in Table 1.
40In contrast, the markup rate for unpatented durables equals one. Given the share of patented durables (z ) equal to 46% (as
in the benchmark case), the industry-wide average markup rate is about 1.21, which falls onto the empirical evidence range (see
Norrbin 1993 and Basu 1996).
41According to Comin (2004), the contribution of R&D to per capita GDP growth in the U.S. is smaller than 3 5th of 1% point.
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In calibration of the µ parameter, we have generated the initial patent-regime steady state at the same
time. Now with a complete set of benchmark parameters in Table 1, we can solve (33a) - (33f) and (34)
for the bounty-regime steady state, respectively, based on the long-run Pareto-optimal bounty rate (b ⇤) and
suboptimal bounty rate (b ⇤⇤). Hence, listed in Table 2 are three sets of steady-state results including (i)
patent-regime steady state, (ii) bounty-regime steady state with long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate b ⇤, and
(iii) bounty-regime steady state with long-run suboptimal bounty rate b ⇤⇤. The following analysis are in
order:
Table 2: Steady states of patent and intertemporal-bounty regimes
Patent Regime (Benchmark) Intertemporal-Bounty Regime
patent length T = 20 bounty rate b ⇤ = 0.30 b ⇤⇤ = 0.14eK0 5.67 eK1 9.50 6.97eV0 1.00 eV1 3.35 1.12eY0 1.90 eY1 2.91 2.14eC0 1.40 eC1 1.99 1.52eu0 1.49 eu1 1.49 1.49eu0eV0 1.49 eu1eV1 4.99 1.67
sK0 0.24 sK1 0.26 0.26
sV0 0.024 sV1 0.053 0.024eC0/eY0 0.73 eC1/eY1 0.68 0.71eK0/eY0 2.99 eK1/eY1 3.27 3.27eV0/eY0 0.53 eV1/eY1 1.15 0.53
z0 0.98 z1 1.00 1.00
zPatented0 0.46 zBountied1 1.00 1.00
P/Y 0.033 B/Y (= ab ) 0.11 0.052
Remarks: b ⇤ (b ⇤⇤) is long-run Pareto-optimal (sub-optimal) bounty rate. Regime-independent are long-run
real interest rate r0 = r1 ⇡ 0.066 and long-run growth rates: Vˆ0 = Vˆ1 ⇡ 0.031; Kˆ0 = Yˆ0 = Cˆ0 = Kˆ1 = Yˆ1 =
Cˆ1 ⇡ 0.031; kˆ0 = yˆ0 = cˆ0 = kˆ1 = yˆ1 = cˆ1 ⇡ 0.02; and ˆTFP0 = ˆTFP1 ⇡ 0.0128, of which ˆTFPR&D0 = 0.0054.
Figures are computed using benchmark parameters from Table 1.
Patent-regime steady state (patent length T = 20) First, from Table 2, the steady state of the benchmark
patent regime pretty much matches the United States macroeconomic features including the R&D intensity
(sV0 = 0.024), the physical capital investment rate (sK0 = 0.24), the consumption/GDP ratio (eC0/eY0 = 1 
sK0  sV0 = 0.73), the capital/output ratio (eK0/eY0 = 2.99), in addition to the long-run real interest rate r
and long-run growth rates of GDP and TFP (see Remarks of Table 2). The knowledge/output ratio (eV0/eY0)
is 0.53. Empirically, this ratio is not precisely available. Under the patent regime, 46% of durable goods
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firms are patented (z0 ⇡ 0.46) and the resulting monopoly-induced technical distortion makes TFP about
2% below its potential level, as implied by z0 ⇡ 0.98.
Bounty-regime steady state (bounty rate b ⇤ = 0.30) We assume the calibrated US economy is initially
in the patent-regime steady state. If we let this decentralized economy switches to an intertemporal-bounty
regime that can fully mimic the social planner’s long-run Pareto optimum, as characterized by (27a) - (27g),
the required bounty rate needs to be set at b ⇤ = 0.30 according to (34). This long-run Pareto optimal bounty
rate dictates that for each dollar sales of bountied goods, the government pays a bounty flow of 30 cents
annually to the bounty-claim holder. The resulting annual aggregate bounty flows (B) account for 11% of
GDP (= Y ), which is funded by a lump-sum tax. In contrast, under the patent regime with a markup rate
(h) of 1.46, the patent holder receives a profit margin of 46 cents from each $1.46 sales of patented goods.
Such patent-created monopoly profits (P) account for about 3.3% of GDP. Economists call these profits
“economic profits,” which are profits beyond the usual or standard rate of business profit.
By implementing the long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate of b ⇤ = 0.30, the regime switch removes
monopoly distortions and optimizes the allocation of foregone consumption to fully internalize knowledge-
spillover and research-congestion externalities. This allows the economy to attain the Pareto optimum in
the long-run, and the associated steady state effects are reported in the b ⇤ = 0.30 column of Table 2. As
indicated, in the long run, the economy becomes much more intensive in capital and knowledge under this
bounty regime. The capital investment rate increases from sK0 = 0.24 to sK1 = 0.26, while the R&D intensity
increases significantly from sV0 = 0.024 to sV1 = 0.053. The stock of scale-adjusted capital rises fromeK0 = 5.67 to eK1 = 9.50, while even more significant is a remarkable increase in the stock of scale-adjusted
knowledge from eV0 = 1.00 to eV1 = 3.35. As a result, under the regime switch, the capital/output ratio (eK/eY )
rises from 2.99 to 3.27, the knowledge/output ratio (eV/eY ) rises significantly from 0.53 to 1.15, and the
shadow price of aggregate innovations is navigated upwards to the social value of eu1eV1 = eu⇤eV ⇤ = 4.99, way
above the private value of aggregate innovations under the patent regime.42 This explains why the regime
switch can generate a long-run consumption gain of about 42% (comparing eC0 = 1.40 to eC1 = 1.99). A
drop of the consumption/GDP ratio from 0.73 to 0.68 is, in fact, indispensable. Compared to the patent
regime, the long-run Pareto-optimal bounty regime requires much more foregone consumption to establish
an economy that is more knowledge-intensive and more capital-intensive.
Bounty-regime steady state (bounty rate b ⇤⇤ = 0.14) As analyzed above, switching to the long-run
Pareto optimal bounty regime requires an annual bounty budget of over 10% of GDP in terms of B/Y =
0.11. This could place a noticeable budget pressure on the government in the real world. If instead the
government pursues a switch to the aforementioned long-run suboptimal bounty regime, the required long-
run suboptimal bounty rate is as low as b ⇤⇤ = 0.14 according to (35) and the resulting annual bounty budget
significantly drops to only 5.2% of GDP (that is, B/Y = 0.052). The steady-state effects of implementing
such a suboptimal regime switch are reported in the b ⇤⇤ = 0.14 column of Table 2. In comparison to the
long-run Pareto optimal bounty regime (b ⇤ = 0.30), we observe that while the capital investment rate still
42Note that eu0 = eu1 = 1.49 in Table 2. This is because f = l = 0.5, which ensure that qV = qK and qu = qV  qK = 0. Thus,
u = eu and uˆ = 0 in the long run according to (23c) and (24).
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Figure 2: Absolute errors of solving (31a) -(31d) with Python’s scikits.bvp_solver
Remarks: ~w ⌘ [eK, eV , eC, eu ] for t 2 [0,1000] and  1⇥10 10 < error < 1⇥10 10.
can reach the Pareto optimal level (sK1 = s⇤K = 0.26), the R&D intensity can only be maintained at the
suboptimal patent-regime level (sV1 = sV0 = 0.024). As a consequence, the private value (eu1eV1 = 1.67) of
aggregate innovations under the suboptimal bounty regime is way below the Pareto-optimal social value
(eu1eV1 = eu⇤eV ⇤ = 4.99). This results in a knowledge stock (eV1 = 1.12) only slightly above the patent-regime
level (eV0 = 1) and way below the socially optimal level (eV1 = eV ⇤ = 3.35). In welfare terms, Switching to this
suboptimal bounty regime generates a smaller long-run consumption gain of 9% (eC1 = 1.52 > eC0 = 1.40),
compared to the long-run optimal consumption gain of 42% as noted above. This is not a surprise at all, since
b ⇤⇤ only resolves monopoly distortions, whereas b ⇤addresses both monopoly distortions and externalities.
The above analysis focuses on the regime switch’s steady state effects only. However, a complete welfare
analysis must take transitional dynamics into account. To this end, we trap how the bounty-regime dynamic
system evolves over time in transition in the next subsection.
5.2 Dynamics in transition
Numerical solution To compute transitional dynamics, we focus on the regime switch by implementing
the long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate b ⇤ = 0.30. The dynamic system of (31a) - (31d) calibrated by the
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benchmark parameter set (Table 1) is found to display saddle path stability around its long-run stationary
equilibrium, which refers to the bounty-regime steady state, [eK1, eV1, eC1, eu1], shown in Table 2. The regime
switch from patents to the intertemporal bounty means a structural change taking place at t = 0. Comput-
ing the transitional dynamics should proceed by trapping the calibrated model’s nonlinear stable manifold
rather than its linearized model’s local saddle path around the bounty-regime steady state. I used a Python
boundary value problem solver (scikits.bvp_solver 1.1) to solve the calibrated system of (31a) - (31d) for
the approximate solution ~w = [eK, eV , eC, eu ].43 The calibrated system is defined on [0, •), a semi-infinite time
interval. To apply the Python bvp solver, I truncated it into a finite time interval, [0, tmax], where tmax = 1000,
and it turns out that one thousand years is long enough for economy to work out all transitional effects.44
Indeed, the Python bvp solver proved fast in just a few seconds and generated precise enough results. As
Figure 2 indicates, the approximate solution is precise to the extent that its absolute errors (or residuals) are
all less than 10 10 in absolute value.
Figure 3: Numerical solution of dynamic system (31a) - (31d)
43scikits.bvp_solver (http://pypi.python.org/pypi/scikits.bvp_solver) is a Python package that wraps a Fortran BVP_SOLVER
based on Mono Implicit Runge Kutta methods; see Shampine et al. (2006). All computations for the present paper are implemented
using Python 2.7.3 on Mac OS 10.6.8. The Python code is available from the author upon request. A Matlab code using bvp4c is
also available.
44The boundary conditions at t ! • need to be approximately satisfied at tmax. If not, we must increase the value of tmax until
the errors are negligible.
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The approximate solution is shown in Figure 3 including the transition paths of the dynamic system’s
two state variables (eK, eV ) and two jump variables (eC, eu). The stocks of capital eK[t] and knowledge eV [t] have
continued to rise in transition until they both reached their long-run steady state equilibrium, respectively.
At the moment of the regime switch, the consumption flow eC jumps down from eC0 to eC[0] and then starts to
grow over time toward a higher steady-state level. To the contrary, the price of the bounty claim eu jumps up
from eu0 to eu [0] and then starts to fall over time toward a lower steady-state level.
Figure 4: Transition paths: Vˆ , gTFP, eY , z , and B/Y
The above-described solution allows to compute other variables’ trajectories. Figure 4 indicates that: (i)
at the moment of the regime switch, the innovation rate Vˆ ⌘ V˙/V jumps up remarkably from Vˆ0 to Vˆ [0] and
then drifts down smoothly in transition to the same steady state level (Vˆ0 = Vˆ1 = qVn) (panel (a)); (ii) to a
lesser degree, both total factor productivity gTFP (= eA1 a = eV 1/(es)) and final output eY jump up at t = 0,
but unlike the innovation rate, they both continue to rise in transition to their long-run steady state levels
(panels (b) & (c)); and (iii) driven by persistent innovation (Vˆ [t] > 0), the bountied fraction z of capital
goods keeps rising all the way toward one (its long-run steady state level), while the bounty/output ratio
B/Y also keeps increasing in transition to a higher steady state ratio equal to 0.11 – this ratio is greater than
the patent-regime steady state profit/output ratio P0/Y0 = 0.033 (Table 2 or pane d)
Notably, the regime switch makes the economy transition to one much more intensive in both capital
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Figure 5: Transition paths: eKeY , eVeY
and knowledge. Figure 5 indicates this feature: the capital/output and knowledge/output ratios ( eKeY , eVeY ) have
trended upward over time remarkably to their new steady state equilibrium, although these ratios experience
a small drop at the moment of the regime switch when final output Y jumps up slightly. All these transi-
tion paths described above make intuitive sense: a more capital-intensive, more knowledge-intensive econ-
omy must require the dual occurrences of short-run consumption sacrifices and bounty-claim appreciation
(compared to the initial patent value eu0) so as to draw more resources into capital accumulation and R&D
investment. By implementing the long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate of b ⇤ = 0.30, this bounty regime can
therefore raise the long-run productive capacity to sustain an eventually higher level of consumption than
does the initial patent regime.
Market mechanism How does the decentralized IBmechanism work to drive the calibrated U.S. economy
to transition to a long-run Pareto optimal balanced growth path, as characterized above by Figures 3 - 5?
First of all, this involves a removal of all patent-created distortions. Thus, at the moment of the regime
switch, the market for capital goods becomes perfectly competitive, selling all durables at marginal cost.
This boosts market demand especially for those durables whose patents have not yet expired, while also
removing the patent-induced technical distortion on total factor productivity (i.e., z0 jumps to z[0] = 1). This
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Figure 6: Transition paths: sK , sV , s, r, b˜u˜
market mechanism explains why total factor productivity and GDP ( gTFP, eY ) jump up together at t = 0
(Figure 4 (b) & (c)), and why the capital /output ratio ( eKeY ) and knowledge/output ratio ( eVeY ) jump down at the
same time (Figure 5), given that eK and eV are predetermined at any point in time.
Further, at the moment of the regime switch, the long-run Pareto-optimal bounty rate b ⇤ is strong enough
to reward technological innovation. It creates bounty claims that are more valuable than patents (eu jumps
up at t = 0; Figure 3 (d)) in the asset market. It also generates a strong bounty flow relative to bounty-claim
price, ebeu , that outweighs the initial monopoly profit flow relative to patent price, ep0eu0 (Figure 6 (d)). Thus,
switching to the bounty regime presents a strong incentive to boost investment in both physical capital and
R&D, causing both sK and sV to jump up at t = 0 (Figure 6 (a)). The resulting strong demands for foregone
consumption therefore make the real interest rate r (Figure 6 (c)) and saving rate s (Figure 6 (b)) jump
up, respectively, at the moment of the regime switch. All these market forces prompt the calibrated U.S.
economy to evolve in transition toward a more capital-intensive and more knowledge-intensive economy.
5.3 Welfare change in transition to the bounty-regime steady state
Using the numerical trajectory of consumption shown earlier in Figure 3 (c), we can compute the welfare
change for the regime switch from patents to an intertemporal bounty that allows the calibrated U.S. econ-
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omy to attain Pareto optimality in the long run. The welfare change is the measure of W[t] that obeys
U [{(1+W[t])c[t]Patent}tt=0] =U [{c[t]Bounty}tt=0], 0 t  t < • (36)
where {c[t]Patent}tt=0 is a stream of per capita consumption for the time interval of [0, t] under the steady-
state patent regime and {c[t]Bounty}tt=0 is the stream of per capita consumption for the same time interval
under a bounty regime in transition. As such, starting from the moment of the regime switch,W[t]measures a
consumption gain for a time interval with the length of duration equal to t, whereasW[•] is the consumption
gain for the entire semi-infinite time interval, [0, •). For instance, if W[t] turns out to be positive, it means
that in time interval [0, t], the regime switch generates a welfare gain equivalent to a percent (=W[t]⇥100%)
increase from the patent-regime steady state.
Formulae for W Note that per capita consumption c[t]⌘C[t]/L[t] can be written as c[t] = eC[t](h[t]L[t])qKL[t] =eC[t]h[t]qKL[t]qA = eC[t]e(qKhˆ+qAn)t in terms of (24) and h[t] = ehˆt and L[t] = ent . Now, given the initial steady
state consumption of eC0 and the bounty-regime transition path of eC[t], we can compute the welfare measure
of W[t], t 2 [0, •), based on the following formulae:
W[t] =
8>>>><>>>>:
ya[t]1/(1 g) 1, with ya[t] =
´ t
0
eC[t]1 ge [r n (1 g)(qK hˆ+qAn)]tdt´ t
0
eC1 g0 e [r n (1 g)(qK hˆ+qAn)]tdt , g 6= 1
eyb[t] 1, with yb[t] =
´ t
0 log[eC[t]/eC0]e (r n)tdt´ t
0 e
 (r n)tdt , g = 1
(37)
If one overlooked the transitional impacts by presuming that the economy jumps from the initial patent-
regime balanced-growth path directly to the new bounty-regime balanced-growth path, then the bounty-
regime scale-adjusted consumption eC would jump to eC1 from eC0 at t = 0 and formulas (37) would reduce
to
W[t] =
eC1eC0  1⌘W, t 2 [0, •), (38)
irrespective of whether g 6= 1 or g = 1.
Magnitudes ofW[t],W[•] andW From the forgoing transitional analysis, the time profile of the consump-
tion flow (Figure 3 (c)) must imply that that W[t]W[•]<W for t 2 [0, •). As reported earlier using Table
2, The regime switch can result in a remarkable increase of 42% in steady-state consumption if the bounty
rate is set at the long-run Pareto optimal level of b ⇤ = 0.30. This implies W = 0.42. The transition path of
W[t] is displayed in Figure 7. As indicated, for the first year (t = 1), there is a consumption loss of 6.2% (due
to W[1] ⇡  0.062), but such a short-run loss keeps diminishing over time. By the time of t = 27 (years),
households have fully recouped short-run consumption sacrifices (due to W[27]⇡ 0. They would eventually
secure a net consumption gain of 5.9% (due to W[•]⇡ 0.059) in the long run, compared to the steady-state
consumption gain of 42%.
Certainly, society can instead take a conservative route to a long-run suboptimal bounty regime without
correcting underinvestment in R&D by implementing the long-run suboptimal bounty rate of b ⇤⇤ = 0.14.
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Figure 7: Changing welfare in transition based on b ⇤ and benchmark parameters including g = 2
From my simulations, the transition paths are qualitatively similar, and as expected, switching to this long-
run suboptimal bounty regime incurs a smaller short-run consumption loss. Yet, this is accompanied by
a significant drop in net consumption gains (measured by W[t ! •) and an even more significant drop in
steady-state consumption gains (measured by W), as summarized in Table 3.
Robustness checks We close the welfare analysis by conducting robustness checks on the switch to the
long-run Pareto optimal bounty regime. From the transition paths of Figure 3, it is implied that the dynamic
system of (31a) - (31d) exhibits saddle-path stability. This feature appears robust to parameter changes from
other numerous experiments. It is found that compared to W, the welfare measure of W[•] is sensitive to
Table 3: Steady-state consumption gain and cumulative consumption gains in transition
Bounty Rate, b W W[t = 1] W[t! •]
b ⇤ = 0.30 0.42  0.062 0.059
b ⇤⇤ = 0.14 0.09  0.027 0.030
Remarks: W[t = 27] = 0 at b ⇤ = 0.30 and W[t = 14] = 0 at b ⇤⇤ = 0.14.
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parameters g (intertemporal substitution), l (research congestion) and f (knowledge spillovers), as shown
in Table 4. For instance, if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (1/g) is increased from 0.5 to 1, the
net consumption gain in terms of W[•] is seen to increase significant either at l (f ) = 0.50 or at l (f) =
0.55. This is actually consistent with our economic intuition: if future consumption is less substitutable
for present consumption, the measure of W[•] must get smaller. As well, with a smaller extent of research
congestion (smaller l ) or with a larger knowledge spillover (greater f ) , a larger consumption gain is seen
to result, irrespective of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Regardless, the central message of these
numerical experiments maintains that an intertemporal bounty regime can be a welfare-improving Pareto
optimal alternative to the world’s patent system.
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis of parameters g and l on welfare change
g 1.00 2.00 2.50
b ⇤ 0.35 0.30 0.29
l = f = 0.50 W 0.53 0.42 0.39
W[•] 0.15 0.059 0.045
b ⇤ 0.39 0.34 0.32
l = 0.55, f = 0.50 W 0.64 0.53 0.48
W[•] 0.19 0.072 0.054
b ⇤ 0.38 0.32 0.30
l = 0.50, f = 0.55 W 0.63 0.50 0.45
W[•] 0.17 0.063 0.048
Remark: (i) The bold figures correspond to benchmark parameters (l = f = 0.5 and g = 2); (ii) W (W[•])
is the rate of consumption gains excluding (including) transitional changes in consumption.
6 Concluding Remarks
First-generation endogenous growth models feature the empirically implausible scale effects, implying a
faster steady-state growth rate for a larger economy. The progression to non-scale growth models removes
the unwanted scale effects, but at the expense of raising the dimensionality. The present paper is no excep-
tion. It has to deal with a four-dimensional dynamic system that governs the transitional dynamics when
the initial patent regime is switched to an intertemporal bounty regime. This system consists of two state
variables – capital & knowledge stocks – evolving at different paces and must be normalized into a station-
ary one using multiple normalization factors. Python’s boundary value problem solver (scikits.bvp_solver)
proved fast and precise in solving such a normalized dynamic system.
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The paper has demonstrated that a decentralized market mechanism via the proposed intertemporal
bounty system can duplicate Pareto optimality, provided that the rate of bounty is set rightly to internalize
externalities. Under this system, the prize for innovation is not paid once and for all. Instead, the prize
is dynamically amortized in an infinitely time domain as periodic bounties paid to the holder of bounty
claims. These periodic bounties are calculated using a government-determined bounty rate times observed
market sales. Certainly, the intertemporal bounty system allows the innovator choose at any time to cash the
entire prize, once and for all, from the bounty claims market. In this paper an important formula is derived
to calculate a long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate that allows the economy to attain Pareto optimum in
the long run by correcting both monopoly distortions and externalities such as knowledge spillovers and
research congestion. Another important formula obtained is to calculate a long-run suboptimal bounty rate
that can only serve to correct monopoly distortions.
Empirically, the social value of innovation is usually much above the private value of innovation. The
government can take the long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate as an upper bound and the long-run subopti-
mal bounty rate as the lower bound when a bounty rate is to be determined to implement the intertemporal
bounty system. Empirical data for the two bounty rates are available in the real world. The government does
not need to estimate the prize size of a specific innovation, since the importance of each innovation can be
revealed over time by the observed market sales of bountied goods. If the market sales drop to zero, the
associated innovation has no value, despite the bounty claim being perpetual legally. Moreover, the bounty
rate can be adjusted as desired to changing economic conditions. This makes the intertemporal bounty sys-
tem practical either as a Pareto optimal alternative if lump-sum taxes are available or as a suboptimal yet
welfare-improving alternative, to the world’s patent system.
The tax-financed bounty for innovation is a type of government transfer payments in society. Yet, if
lump-sum taxes are not available in the real world, it is necessary to source the least distortionary tax for
the IB system to secure a larger welfare gain. Besides, in some cases, there is a need to work out ways to
split the bounty among holders of bounty claims. For instance, if a bountied good (like cellphone) is based
on multiple innovations, rather than just one single innovation as assumed in the present study, then how
to determine their embodied importance will not be an easy task. The present paper represents an initial
inquiry in hopes of inspiring further research into the proposed IB system as a decentralized mechanism
designed to make innovation viable under perfect competition.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Earl Grinols, Chris Papageorgiou, Stephen Turnovsky, and other attendants
for their comments on the intertemporal bounty system discussed at an economics workshop held in IHS
Vienna, and would also like to thank Constantine Angyridis, Angus Chu, Tatsuro Iwaisako, Benjamin Russo,
and Paul Gaggl for their comments on an earlier draft that was presented at the 17th Annual International
Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis and International Finance (2013) held at the University of Crete,
Rethymno, Greece. The paper was funded by the Belk College Summer Research Award of 2011 from the
Belk College of Business, University of North Carolina at Charlotte.
36
Appendix
A Patent regime’s balanced growth paths
Along a balanced-growth path, every variable grows at a constant rate, including zero growth. Such steady-
state growth rates (Vˆ0 ⌘ V˙0V0 , Aˆ0 ⌘ A˙0A0 , Kˆ0 ⌘ K˙0K0 and Yˆ0 ⌘ Y˙0Y0 ) can be obtained by solving the four equations
system:
Yˆ0  Kˆ0 = 0 (A.1a)
(f  1)Vˆ0+lYˆ0 = 0 (A.1b)
Yˆ0  (1 a)Aˆ0 aKˆ0 = (1 a)(n+ hˆ) (A.1c)
Aˆ0  1es(1 a)Vˆ0 = 0 (A.1d)
These equations result from (22a), (22b), (18), and the definition of A. For instance, (22a) implies Yˆ0 = Kˆ0 =
Cˆ0. Solving (A.1a) - (A.1d) yields (23a) - (23c). From (14) and (8b), the patent price equation is given by
u = sVY/V˙ = sVY/(VˆV ). Along a balanced-growth path, both sV and Vˆ are stationary. Thus, differentiating
the patent price equation yields
uˆ0 ⌘ u˙0u0 = Yˆ0 Vˆ0 = (qK qV )(n+ hˆ) (A.2)
Derivations of the remaining stationary variables are in order. First, from the Euler condition (3) and using
growth kernels qK andqA, the steady-state interest rate is given by
r0 = r+ g[n qK(hˆ+n)] (A.3)
Next, from (21b), the steady-state capital/output ratio is given below
K0
Y0
=
a(1 m0)
r0+d
(A.4)
This result and (8a) combine to imply the steady-state capital investment rate,
sK0 = a(1 m0)
 
d +qK(n+ hˆ)
r0+d
!
= a(1 m0)
 
d +(n+ hˆ)+ Aˆ0
r0+d
!
(A.5)
Recall that P denotes aggregate profit flows and p =P/(zV ) measures a patented firm’s profit flow. Using
(21a) and (13) yields the steady-state price of a newly issued patent,
u0[t] =
am0Y0[t]
z0V0[t]
 
1  e (r0 Yˆ0+Vˆ0)T
r0  Yˆ0+Vˆ0)
!
, or eu0 = am0eY0z0eV0
 
1  e (r0 Yˆ0+Vˆ0)T
r0  Yˆ0+Vˆ0)
!
(A.6)
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where eu0=u0[t]/(h[t]L[t])qK qV , eY0=Y0[t]/(h[t]L[t])qK , and eV0=V0[t]/(h[t]L[t])qV are constant on a balanced-
growth path. Also, with z˙0 = 0 and Vˆ = Vˆp = Vˆnp = qV (n+ hˆ) in the steady state, either (16a) or (16b) implies
the equilibrium patented goods fraction,
z0 = 1  e Vˆ0T (A.7)
The R&D equilibrium condition (14) requires x [t]u [t] = 1 at any instant, which implies u [t]V˙ [t] = sV [t]Y [t]
in terms of (8b). Along a balanced growth, we therefore have sV0 = u0Vˆ0V0/Y0, which, together with (A.6),
implies
sV0 = Vˆ0
✓
am0
z0
◆ 
1  e (r0 Yˆ0+Vˆ0)T
r0  Yˆ0+Vˆ0
!
(A.8)
Lastly, the two stock variables (K, V ) are non-stationary. Using these scale-adjusted quantities, eK ⌘
K/(hL)qK , eY ⌘Y/(hL)qK , and eA= A/(hL)qA , we can transform the final goods production function (18) into
its intensive form, eY = zeA1 a eKa , and the motion of capital accumulation (12) into e˙K ⌘ d eKdt = sKeY   (d +
qK(n+ hˆ))eK. Setting e˙K = 0 then yields the steady state scale-adjusted stock of capital,
eK0 = eA0✓ z0sK0d +qK(n+ hˆ)
◆1/(1 a)
, (A.9)
On a balanced-growth path, the stock of knowledge capital V keeps growing at a rate equal to qV (n+ hˆ).
But we can normalize V to eV ⌘ V/(hL)qV . Then dividing each side of the innovation equation (22b) by V0
while replacing V0 and Y0 with eV0(hL)qV and eY0(hL)qK in this equation, we obtain
V˙0
V0
= qV (n+ hˆ) = µeV f 10 (sV0eY0)l (hL)(f 1)qV+lqK (A.10)
where term (hL)(f 1)qV+lqK can drop out due to (f 1)qV +lqK = 0 (see (24)). Now using eY0 = z0eA1 a0 eKa0 ,eA0 = eV 1/(es(1 a))0 , and result (A.9), we can easily solve (A.10) for the steady state scale-adjusted stock of
knowledge, which is given in (25b).
B Steady state of the normalized dynamic system
First, setting e˙K = 0 in (29a) and using (32a) yield the stationary equilibrium of eK,
eK1 = ✓ sKd +qK(n+ hˆ)
◆1/(1 a) eA1 (B.1)
Second, setting e˙K = 0 in (29a) and using (32e) yield the equilibrium capital investment rate,
sK1 = (d +qK(n+ hˆ))
eK1eY1 = (d +qK(n+ hˆ))
✓
a
r1+d
◆
(B.2)
Third, setting e˙V = 0 in (31b) yields (sV1eY1)l = qV (n+hˆ)µeV f 11 and (32d) implies (sV1eY1)1 l = µ eu1eV f1 . Com-
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bining these two equations yields the equilibrium level of R&D,
sV1eY1 = eu1eV1qV (n+ hˆ) (B.3)
Fourth, replacing eb with (32b) and setting e˙u = 0 in (31d), we obtain
r1 ba
eY1eu1eV1 = (qK qV )(n+ hˆ) (B.4)
Then replacing eu1eV1 in (B.4) with sV1eY1/(qV (n+ hˆ)) based on the result of (B.3), we obtain the equilibrium
R&D investment rate,
sV1 =
ba ·qV (n+ hˆ)
r1  (qK qV )(n+ hˆ)
(B.5)
where r1 = r0 = r+ g[qAn+qKhˆ]. Substituting sV1 into (B.3) yields (33d) in the text.
Fifth, using eY = eA1 a eKa and (B.1), we can rewrite (sV1eY1)l = qV (n+hˆ)µeV f 11 (from step 3) as
slV1
✓
sK1
d +qK(n+ hˆ)
◆la/(1 a) eAl1 = qV (n+ hˆ)µeV f 11 (B.6)
Then replacing eA1 with eV 1/(es(1 a))1 and collect the eV1 terms in (B.6), we obtain (33b) in the text.
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